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AMERIcAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW
I. INTRODUCTION
By any estimate, Leroy Hendricks would rank among society's worst. His
chilling thirty-year career as a child sex offender began in 1955 when, at the age of
twenty, he pled guilty to indecently exposing himself to two young girls.2
Subsequent years witnessed a stream of other convictions: in 1957, for playing
strip poker with a teenage girl;3 in 1960, for molesting two young boys at a
carnival;4 in 1963, for molesting a seven-year-old girl;5 and in 1967, for sexually
assaulting an eight-year old girl and an eleven-year-old boy.
6
Upon being paroled in 1972, Hendricks sexually abused his own step-children
for several years,7 and in 1984 pled guilty to taking indecent liberties with two
other adolescent boys.8 Although Hendricks was eligible to receive a sentence of
45 to 180 years because he was a habitual felon, the State of Kansas dropped one
count of child abuse and permitted him to serve only two concurrent sentences of
five to twenty years. 9 Under these terms, Hendricks could look forward to release
in 1994, after serving ten years.' 0
Kansas authorities, however, had other ideas for how Hendricks, then sixty
years old, could spend the rest of his life. In the wake of the highly publicized July
1993 rape and murder of Agnes Schmidt by a recently paroled sex offender, an ad
hoc group which included members of Ms. Schmidt's family, law enforcement
personnel, and parole board members organized to prevent such a tragic reoccur-
rence. The efforts of the Schmidt Task Force culminated in 1994, just before
Hendricks was scheduled to be released from prison, with the enactment of the
Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA)."1 As applied, the SVPA subjected
Hendricks to likely indefinite involuntary civil commitment-after the completion
of his prison term.
Sexual offenders such as Hendricks posed a special problem to Kansas legisla-
tors: although the suffering from "anti-social personality features" made them
2. See In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 143 (Kan. 1996) (Larson, J., dissenting).
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See id. Altogether, Hendricks spent roughly half his life between the ages of twenty and sixty imprisoned for
reported sex offenses. Hendricks also showed a persistent disdain for treatment, even though his sentences were
extended as a result. According to Hendricks, "treatment was bullshit." Id.
6. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2078 (1997).
7. See id. The record does not indicate whether Hendricks was ever charged in connection with the assault on
his step-children.
8. See id.
9. See In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 136. Under the terms of the Kansas Habitual Criminal Act, Hendricks
would have been eligible for parole in the year 2007 at the age of 73. It remains unclear why Kansas dismissed the
third count and refrained from prosecuting him as a habitual criminal.
10. See id.
11. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(a) (1994). The SVPA defines a "sexually violent predator" as "any person who has
been convicted of or charged with a sexually violent offense and who suffers from a mental abnormality or personality
disorder which makes the person likely to engage in the predatory acts of sexual violence." The Act was modeled after a
nearly identical scheme enacted by the State of Washington in 1990. See WAsHi. REv. CODE § 71.09.010 (1990).
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"unamenable to existing treatment modalities," the absence of "mental disease or
defect" among such offenders made them ineligible for conventional involuntary
civil confinement. 12 Added to these practical treatment challenges was the recogni-
tion that, although relatively few in number, "sexually violent predators" were an
"extremely dangerous group" whose peculiar psychological makeup made them
"likely to engage in [future] sexually violent behavior." 13
Frustrated with this unmet interstitial need, and wanting to keep Leroy Hen-
dricks off the streets, the Legislature passed the SVPA to ensure the "long-term
care and treatment"' 4 of persons such as Hendricks. Paradoxically, however,
Kansas had not taken any of the steps necessary to provide such treatment,'
5
prompting the Kansas Supreme Court to characterize the Legislature's "treat-
ment" motivation as "somewhat disingenuous," 16 an inference buttressed by the
fact that commitment (and hence "treatment") occurred only when the "predator"
faced imminent release from prison. 17
In enacting the SVPA, Kansas fell in line with a distinctly modem trend: the
enactment of laws designed to impose additional, retrospective sanctions on
persons already punished under a state's criminal laws. Although in the recent past
Americans seemed content to impose harsh prison sentences, and leave it at that,
today this is no longer enough. Ours has become a "jurisprudence of preven-
tion,""' and the foremost target of our obsessive concern is the loathsome,
seemingly irredeemable sex offender.19 Compelling evidence of this trend lies in
12. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. See In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 131 (stating that while in custody Hendricks found no professionals were
available who were specifically dedicated to treatment of sexually violent predators).
16. Id. at 136.
17. Id. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2094 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("It is difficult to see why rational legislators
who seek treatment would write the Act in this way-providing treatment years after the criminal act that
indicated its necessity."). That the State felt predators to be unamenable to treatment before release, while still in
prison, is evident from the Preamble of the SVPA itself: "The legislature further finds that the prognosis for
rehabilitating sexually violent predators in a prison setting is poor ,.. "KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (1994).
18. See generally Edward P. Richards, The Jurisprudence of Prevention: The Right of Societal Self-Defense
Against Dangerous Individuals, 16 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 329 (1989) (providing interesting treatment of how
American courts have grappled with threats of epidemic and disease). In one prescient passage, Richards
observed that "[from an individual rights perspective, the most troubling scenario is the evolution of a model that
uses public health and safety rhetoric to justify procedures that are, in essence, punishment and detention .... The
potential consequence for a dangerous individual would be indeterminate detention, indistinguishable from
punitive imprisonment." Id. at 386.
19. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 104-555 at 2 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 980, 981 ("Perhaps no type
of crime has received more attention in recent years than crimes against children involving sexual acts and
violence"); Peter Davis, The Sex Offender Next Door, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, July 28, 1996, at 20 (analogizing
outcast-status of released sex offender to that of leper); David van Biema, Burn Thy Neighbor, TIME, July 26,
1993, at 58 (noting that "mass culture and some experts view violent sex offenders as irredeemable monsters");
Mimi Hall, A Furor Brews Over Release of Sex Offenders, USA ToDAY, Aug. 17, 1994, at A3 (describing
nationwide public anger over sex crimes committed by recidivists and chroniciing legislative efforts to address
problem). See also Stanley Mosk, The Brennan Lecture: States'Rights-and Wrongs, 72 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 552, 556
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both the tsunami of copy-cat "Megan's Laws" sweeping the nation,20 and the
numerous recently enacted "Sexual Predator" laws,2 1 of which the Kansas SVPA
is but one example.22 Along with substantially increased sentences for new sex
(1997) (noting nationwide proliferation of 100-year plus sentences for sex offenders and suggesting ascendance of
"newly revised [sentencing] theory: nothing succeeds like excess.").
20. See, e.g., IND. CODE:ANN. § 5-2-12-11 (Michie 1997) ("Zachary's Law," in memory of Zachary Snider);
TEx, REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-13c.1 (West 1996) ("Ashley's Law," in memory of Ashley Estell).
Typically, these laws require sex offenders to register with local authorities upon their release from prison and
permit authorities to notify communities of offenders' whereabouts. All fifty states now have some version of
"Megan's Law" on the books. See Daniel L. Feldman, The "Scarlet Letter Laws" of the 1990s: A Response to the
Critics, 60 ALH. L. REV. 1081, 1083 n.2 (1997) (citing Scott Matson & Roxanne Lieb, WASHINGTON STATE INST.
FOR PUB. POLICY, Community Notification in Washington State: 1996 Survey of Law Enforcement (Nov. 1996)).
The federal government has responded in kind, with Congress's approval in 1994 of the Jacob Wetterling Crimes
Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (1994), which requires states to
establish registration programs for sex offenders, and provides guidelines for the dissemination of such information. States
failing to comply risk losing federal funding for law enforcement initiatives. 42 U.S.C. § 14071(f)(2)(A). The Supreme
Court recently denied certiorari as to two cases upholding the constitutionality of registration and notification provisions.
See Doe v. Pataki, 120 F.3d 1263, 1284 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1066 (1998); E.B. v. Vemiero, 119 F3d
1077, 1111 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. deniedsub nom., W.P. v. Vemiero, 118 S. Ct. 1039 (1998).
The success of sex offender registration and notification requirements appears mixed at best, if not downright
counterproductive. See Michael L. Bell, Pennsylvania's Community Notification Law: Will It Protect Communi-
ties from Repeat Sex Offenders?, 34 DuQ. L. REV. 635, 656 (1996) ("[A] large number of released sex offenders
... report false addresses or never register with the proper authorities."); Mike Allen, Girl's Slaying Exposes
Limits of Connecticut "Megan's Law", N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1998 at B I (describing failure of law to prevent
murder of young victim, noting inadequacy of registry). Whether such concerns will have much effect remains to
be seen. As noted by one commentator: "The main purpose of these laws cannot be merely to prevent future
crimes. Rather, by denouncing released sex offenders, these laws satisfy the community's social and emotional
need to define itself in a way that excludes these offenders." Brian J. Telpner, Comment, Constructing Safe
Communities: Megan 's Laws and the Purposes of Punishment, 85 GEo. L.J. 2039, 2068 (1997).
Meanwhile, the tangible adverse effects of such provisions are becoming increasingly evident. In mid-February
1998, convicted sex offender Thomas Varnum committed suicide days after Maine authorities began to inform his
neighbors of his prior offense. See Suicide Is Recalled As Maine Revisits Megan's Law, WASH. POST, Feb. 17,
1998, at A2 (noting that Varnum left taped message that he could not "live in a world where there was no
forgiveness."). In July 1998, California sex offender Michael Patton ended his life under similar circumstances.
See Todd S. Purdum, Death of Sex Offender Tied to Megan's Law, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 1998, at A16. In June 1998,
five gunshots were fired into the home of New Jersey sex offender Frank Perna, about whom police notified
neighbors less than two weeks before. See Robert Hanley, Shots Fired at the House of Rapist Out on Parole, N.Y.
TIMES, June 17, 1998, at BI.
21. "Sexual predator" laws have their historical roots in the "sexual psychopath" laws popular in the late
1930's, but recently have largely succumbed to desuetude or repeal. See Mama J. Johnson, Comment,
Minnesota's Sexual Psychopathic Personality and Sexually Dangerous Persons Statute: Throwing Away the Key,
21 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1139, 1141 (1996); AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH
STANDARDS, Std 7-8.1 (1989) (recommending repeal of sexual psychopath laws). In contrast to the old laws, which
diverted offenders to treatment in lieu of prison, the new "sexual predator" laws seek to have offenders committed to
mental institutions in addition to (and after) prison. Johnson, supra, at 1141 n.12. The Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of Minnesota's "psychopath" law in 1940. See Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270,
276 (1940). For an overview of criticism of such statutes, more generally see Andrew Horwitz, Sexual Psychopath
Legislation: Is There Anywhere to Go But Backwards?, 57 U. Prrr. L. REV. 35,38-48 (1995).
22. At this time, twelve jurisdictions have "predator" statutes, permitting offenders to be institutionalized
upon their release from prison. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, CIVIL COMMITMENT LAWS,
AUGUST 1998 (pub. date) (citing Arizona, California, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, North
Dakota, New Jersey, Washington, Wisconsin).
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offenders, the interventions form a comprehensive strategy of social control with
great appeal to a frustrated public clamoring for protection from sex offenders.2 3
That this should occur now is not surprising for the ingredients are at the ready:
an obvious empathy for the targets of sexual abuse, especially children; 24 a
radicalized, politically empowered "victims' rights" movement;2 5 Americans'
unmitigated desire to impose yet harsher prison sentences on criminals, and
concomitant disavowal of the "rehabilitative ideal" ;26 and widespread distrust
over the justice system's capacity to protect citizens from violent crime. 2 7 Nor can
23. According to two proponents, "[w]hile a useful tool, Megan's law alone might not be sufficient. Megan's
law addresses the community's need for information, but it relies solely upon community self-help. It does
nothing to keep dangerous sex offenders who have a high possibility of recidivism from being able to strike
again." Robert Teir & Kevin Coy, Approaches to Sexual Predators: Community Notification and Civil
Commitment, 23 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 405, 406 (1997).
The State of Kentucky has been at the vanguard of jurisdictions taking aggressive new measures against sex
offenders. In addition to substantially increasing sentences for first-time and repeat offenders, Kansas has enacted
both its own "Megan's Law" and a sexually violent predator statute. See Stephen R. McAllister, The
Constitutionality of Kansas Laws Targeting Sex Offenders, 36 WASHBURN L.J. 419, 422-30 (1997).
24. While the traumatic and long-term effects of sexual abuse on adults have long been known, studies
increasingly highlight the dramatic effects of such abuse on youngsters. See generally CATHY S. WIDOM, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, VICTIMS OF CHILDHOOD SEXUAL ABUSE: LATER CRImIAL CONSEQUENCES (1995) (concluding
child sexual abuse victims are more likely to engage in criminal behaviors later in life). In addition, recent studies
indicate that the incidence of child sex abuse is significantly underreported. See ROBERT A. PRENTKY ETr AL., U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, NAT'L INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, CHILDHOOD SEXUAL MOLESTATION: RESEARCH ISSUES 1 (June 1997).
Although recidivism rates vary among studies, on the whole, rates for pedophiles in particular remain too high
for Americans' comfort. See Eric S. Janus. The Use of Social Science and Medicine in Sex Offender Commitment,
23 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 347, 372 n.111 (1997) (citing studies). But see David P. Bryden &
Roger C. Park, "Other Crimes "Evidence in Sex Offense Cases, 78 MINN. L. REv. 529,572 (1994) (showing "both
higher and lower recidivism rates for certain populations of sex offenders, but no study has demonstrated that sex
offenders have a consistently higher or lower recidivism rate than other major offenders..."); Joyce Price, States
Find New Ways to Stop Sex Offenders, WASH. TIMEs, Oct. 1, 1995, at Al (quoting founder of Sexual Disorders
Clinic at Johns Hopkins Medical Center as concluding that studies show a "tremendous range of recidivism
among pedophiles, ranging from ten percent to seventy percent."). Summing up the basic uncertainty regarding
the research, Robert Prentky and his co-authors recently commented: sexual offender laws "are often based on
assumptions about sex offenders that are, at best, misleading and, at worst, erroneous .... Practitioners should be
guided by moderation, clear vision and empirical evidence." But see also PRENTKY ET AL., supra, at 14-15.
This empirical uncertainty is starkly belied by the words and acts of politicians. See, e.g., Jon R. Sorensen,
Vacco Seeks Crackdown on Pedophiles: Proposes Legislation to Prohibit Bail, Create Life-Without-Parole
Option, BUFFALO NEWS, Aug. 9, 1995, at All (according to New York Attorney General Dennis Vacco, purported
high recidivism rates among pedophiles justify life sentences). See generally Sara S. Beale, What's Law Got to Do
With It? The Political, Social, Psychological and Other Non-Legal Factors Influencing the Development of
(Federal) Criminal Law, 1 BUFF. CRiM. L. REv. 23 (1997) (discussing negligible effect that expert opinion and
empirical evidence have on criminal justice policy making).
25. See generally Robert B. Mosteller, Victims'Rights and the United States Constitution: An Effort to Recast
the Battle in Criminal Litigation, 85 GEO. L.J. 1691 (1997); Peggy M. Tobolowsky, "Constitutionalizing" Crime
Victim Rights, 33 CRiM. LAW BULL. 395 (1997).
26. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 994(k) (1994) (repudiating rehabilitation as sentencing goal under U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines); 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c) (1994) (federal "three strikes" law).
27. See, e.g., SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 1996, Table 2.23 (U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE eds.,
1997) (reporting that 48% of those asked about confidence in ability of police to protect citizens from violent
crime replied "not very much" or "none at all."); Flawed Law, WALL ST. J., July 9, 1996, atA18 (arguing that the
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the role of the media-in whose glare the "mad" and the "bad" have become
synonymous-be underestimated. While twenty years ago the sexual abuse and
killings of Polly Klaas and Megan Kanka would have ignited local concern, today
they serve as galvanizing national rallying causes for changes in the ways sex
offenders are treated. 28 The tragedies become emotionally compelling "narra-
tives" or "paradigms," the horrible details of which serve as catalysts to promote
swift changes in the justice system.29
These historic forces have coalesced to create a combustible mix of compelling
issues that legislators, already acutely sensitive to emerging public opinions and
concerns, have found difficult to resist.30 Perhaps emboldened by the notable
public is dissatisfied with "progressive psychologists, who insist that perverts and hardened criminals can be
rehabilitated if put in the right therapy program ... .
28. See, e.g., Tupper Hull, Polly Case Huge Boost to Anti-crime Drive, SAN FRANcisCO EXAMINER, Dec. 11,
1993, at A5 (regarding Polly Klaas); Maury Povich Show, Sept. 8, 1994 (regarding Megan Kanka). To an
overwhelming extent, Americans today get their information about crime from media sources, which play a
critical role in "agenda-setting" in politics. See Beale, supra note 24, at 44-50; KATHERINE BECKETT, MAKING
CRIME PAY: LAW AND ORDER IN CoNTEMPORARY AMERICAN PoLITcs 62-63 (1997). See also Roy E. LoTz, CRIME
AND THE AMERICAN PREss 2 (1991) ("Crime runs rampant in the American press; papers do such a brisk business
in crime that they are, in effect, advertising disorder.").
29. See John Q. La Fond, Washington's Sexually Violent Predator Law: A Deliberate Misuse of the Therapeutic
State for Social Control, 15 PuGET SouND L. REv. 655,677 (1992) ("[S]tories are compelling.... Lawmakers use
narrative when constructing the paradigm case.... to pass laws that promise the public that this case will never
happen again."). See also Beale, supra note 24, at 57 (discussing studies on "overgeneralization, i.e., the
excessive degree to which people base views on a few cases or even a single case.").
At the same time, the stereotyped image of the unrepentant sex offender fuels the public perception of the
"otherness" of such offenders, making it less likely that constituents will speak out against draconian measures
imposed on sex offenders. See Markus K. Dubber, The Right to Be Punished: Autonomy and Its Demise in Modem
Penal Thought, 16 LAW & HIST. REV. 113, 136 (1998) (stating that since the Enlightenment, "violent offenders
[have been] perceived as radically different and thus precluded from empathic identification. As a disgrace to
human nature, they quite literally lacked the fundamental characteristics of humanity that make identification and
therefore empathy possible."). See also PRENTKY ET AL., supra note 24, at 16 ("society resists treating sexual
offenders... because to do so is perceived as a humane response to intolerable behavior.").
30. See, e.g., Robert Schwaneberg, Jersey Lawmakers Scramble to Take Advantage of Sensational Headlines,
STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Aug. 21, 1994, at A3. Legislators at the federal level show an equal susceptibility.
The 1994 Congress made significant changes to Federal Rules of Evidence 413-415, permitting district courts to
admit "propensity evidence, including that concerning uncharged and unrelated sex offenses" in sexual assault
and child molestation cases. Numerous commentators have criticized the amendments, noting the politically
charged atmosphere in which they were rapidly adopted. See, e.g., James J. Duane, The New Federal Rules of
Evidence on Prior Acts of Accused Sex Offenders: A Poorly Drafted Version of a Very Bad Idea, 157 F.R.D. 95
(1994); David P. Leonard, Perspectives on Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence 413-415: The Federal Rules of
Evidence and the Political Process, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 305 (1995).
One event from Congress's consideration of the new Rules is emblematic of the legislative dynamic. Rising to
urge his colleagues to vote for the measure, Senate Majority Leader Robert Dole invoked the disturbing case of
Charles Getz, convicted of raping his 11-year old daughter. Getz's conviction had been overturned by the
Delaware Supreme Court because evidence of his prior sexual assaults had been improperly admitted. Senator
Dole proclaimed that the "tragic result" of the prohibition against allowing character evidence was that "the
defendant walked." However, Getz did not "walk"; he was immediately retried without the character evidence,
convicted, and sentenced to life in prison. See Margaret C. Livnah, Branding the Sexual Predator: Constitutional
Ramifications of Federal Rules of Evidence 413 Through 415,44 CLEv. ST. L. REV. 169, 171 (1996).
1266
1998] THE Ex POST FACTO CLAUSE AND THE JURISPRUDENCE OF PUNISHMENT 1267
popularity of innovative "Scarlet Letter" sanctions of the 1980s, 31 and the success
of "hybrid" administrative sanctions such as "civil" fines and forfeitures,
32
American legislatures with lightning speed have moved to impose novel new
post-confinement methods of social control that strain our historic understandings
of "punishment." 
33
What is surprising, however, is that this sea-change is taking place in an
apparent constitutional vacuum. Since its origin in 1787, the Ex Post Facto Clause,
prominently set forth in Article I of the United States Constitution, has unequivo-
cally prohibited state and federal governments from enacting "ex post facto
laws"-penal laws that are retroactive in their effect.34 In this constitutional
capacity, the Clause has guarded against the "hydraulic pressures" 35 that periodi-
cally beset our majoritarian political processes and compel lawmakers to impose
retroactive punishments on maligned individuals and groups "of the moment.
' 36
Over the centuries, the Clause has been invoked by a veritable "who's who" of
scorned Americans-from supporters of the Confederacy in the late 1860s, to
immigrants in the late 1800s, to Communist sympathizers in the 1950s. To this list,
we can now add sex offenders. That sex offenders are deserving of disdain is not
the issue, for they surely are. The issue, rather, is whether they deserve the
protection of the Constitution, which they surely do.
In its Fall 1996 term, the Supreme Court addressed Leroy Hendricks's claim that
his involuntary "civil" commitment under the Kansas SVPA was in reality
retroactive punishment, imposed in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. By a 5-4
margin, with Justice Clarence Thomas writing for the majority, the Court rejected
31. See generally Jon A. Brilliant, Note, The Modem Day Scarlet Letter: A Critical Analysis of Modem
Probation Conditions, 1989 DuKE L.J. 1357 (discussing "proliferation" of such punishments: requiring a purse
snatcher to wear "tap shoes"; forcing a drunk driver to apologize in a local newspaper; and requiring a child
molester to place a warning sign on his car, in 3" letters, stating: "DANGEROUS SEX OFFENDER-NO
CHILDREN ALLOWED."); Douglas Litowitz, The Trouble With "Scarlet Letter" Punishments, 81 JUDICATURE
52 (1997) (describing several such punishments and arguing that "shunning" is ineffectual).
32. See Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground Between Criminal and Civil Law, 101
YALE L.J. 1795, 1849-52 (1992).
33. Professor Mary Cheh noted this trend in 1991, saying: "We are in the midst of fundamentally altering the
way we approach criminal justice problems. Law enforcement authorities are no longer content to fight crime with
the traditional methods of arrest, prosecution, and jailing .... At the moment, law enforcement practices are
running ahead of our legal theories and our procedural systems." Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using
Civil Remedies to Achieve Criminal Law Objectives: Understanding and Transcending the Criminal-Civil Law
Distinction, 42 HAST. L.J. 1325, 1413 (1991). See also Bill McCollum, The Struggle for Effective Anti-Crime
Legislation-An Analysis of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 20 U. DAYTON L. REV.
561, 561 (1995) (according to Congressman McCollum, "[flrequent news reports of vicious crimes shock and
frighten the public and send policy makers searching for new solutions.").
34. Article I actually contains two Ex Post Facto Clauses, one applying to the States, U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10,
cl. 1, and another to Congress, U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 3. For present purposes, the respective Clauses will be
referred to collectively.
35. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 867 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Northern Securities Co. v.
United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400-01 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
36. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 138 (1810).
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Hendricks' claim, concluding that the SVPA was remedial and non-punitive in
nature, and hence consistent with the Ex Post Facto Clause's proscription against
retroactive punishment.37
The Court's decision that the SVPA did not impose "punishment" is yet another entry
in its ongoing examination of the "punishment question," a matter of threshold
constitutional significance, potentially triggering a broad array of constitutional protec-
tions, including those of the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments, as well as the Bill of
Attainder and Ex Post Facto Clauses. Despite this importance, the Court's numerous
decisions in the area have amounted to an incoherent muddle. Indeed, one would be
hard-pressed to identify an area of constitutional law that betrays a greater conceptual
incoherence.38 Until recently, this abiding tolerance by the Court for its intellectual
disarray has been regrettable, but of relatively little constitutional consequence.
With Hendricks, however, the Court made a major misstep with enormous
potential consequences that extend far beyond any narrow definitional quest. In a
sharp departure from its settled jurisprudence, dictating that the punishment
question be assessed in terms of "the evils" the constitutional provision was
"designed to eliminate,"39 the Court addressed Hendricks's ex post facto claim in
blatant disregard for the basic purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clause.
In our increasingly punitive, public opinion-sensitive age, Hendricks can only
be taken as an ominous development. Feeling the public's urgent desire for
aggressive, innovative methods of social control, American legislatures today are
pressing the envelope of the criminal-civil distinction like never before-enacting
post-confinement sanctions that betray a shrewd awareness of the importance of
the "criminal" label. This tendency, of course, is not unique, for the Ex Post Facto
Clause arose out of this very concern for legislative vindictiveness. What is
unique, and most troubling, is the disappearance of the Clause from modern
constitutional discourse, and the Court's abdication of its constitutional duty to
give meaning to it. Hendricks standsas proof of that abdication.
This Article seeks to develop a meaningful analytic framework to answer the
punishment question from the standpoint of the Ex Post Facto Clause. After
examining the majority and dissenting opinions in Hendricks in Part II, Part III
discusses the historic origins and purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clause. Part IV of
the Article canvasses the Court's extended, unsuccessful endeavor to articulate and
apply a reliable jurisprudence on the "punishment question," and Part V attempts
to formulate a reliable, constitutionally based approach to resolving the punish-
ment question in a manner consistent with the Ex Post Facto Clause. With the
punishment question properly framed, it is hoped, the Clause itself can be rescued
from its ill-deserved desuetude for the precise historic times in which the Framers
intended it to operate.
37. Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997).
38. See infra notes 125-166 and accompanying text.
39. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437,442 (1965).
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II. KANSAS V. HENDRICKS
A. The Certification of Leroy Hendricks
In August 1994, less than one month before he was to be released from prison,
the State of Kansas petitioned to have Leroy Hendricks branded a "sexually
violent predator,",40 and pursuant to the SVPA, the local district court found
probable cause for his certification. 4' At the ensuing commitment trial, Hendricks
testified that although he had not had any urge to sexually molest children since
1985, and was aware that if he did molest he would likely spend the rest of his life
in prison, he was a "pedophile" and that when he "g[ot] stressed out" he could not
"control the urge" to molest.42 Hendricks also admitted that, while he did not wish
to reoffend, the only " guarantee" that he would not do so was for him "to die."-
43
The jury concluded that Hendricks was a "sexually violent predator." As a
result, he was eligible to petition for annual assessment of whether his "mental
abnormality or personality disorder has so changed that [he was] safe to be at large
and will not engage in acts of sexual violence if discharged."
44
Hendricks appealed his commitment, arguing, inter alia, that the SVPA violated
substantive and procedural due process, constituted an impermissible ex post facto
40. The SVPA defines a "sexually violent predator" as "any person who has been convicted of or charged with
a sexually violent offense and who suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder which makes the
person likely to engage in predatory acts of violence." KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(b) (1994). Under the SVPA,
commitment determinations are to be made near the conclusion of the sexual offender's prison term, the rationale
being that the "treatment" needs of such offenders are "very long term" and prison is not conducive to their cure.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (Supp. 1996). The State agency having custody of the offender is to notify the local
prosecutor within ninety days of the expected release of the offender. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a03(a) (1994). The
prosecutor then must decide whether to petition for involuntary commitment. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a04
(1994). If a petition is filed, a hearing is held to decide whether probable cause exists to determine whether the
offender is a "sexually violent predator." If probable cause exists, the offender is then transferred to an
"appropriate secure facility" for evaluation. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a05 (1994).
41. Hendricks unsuccessfully moved for dismissal of the petition in the trial court on ex post facto, double
jeopardy, substantive due process, and equal protection grounds. In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 130.
The Kansas Legislature amended the SVPA after Hendricks's commitment in respects not relevant to the case.
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a01 to 17 (Supp. 1996).
42. In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 131.
43. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2078.
44. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a08 (1997). Alternatively, the Secretary of Social Services is empowered to
certify an offender's improved mental condition and authorize the offender to petition the court for release. A
procedure similar to that already described then ensues. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a10 (1997).
As a practical matter, however, Hendricks faced a decidedly uphill battle to establish "probable cause" that he
would not pose a risk if released. Given the incalculable professional and personal risks associated with an
incorrect certification of non-dangerousness, risk-averse decision-makers are likely to over-predict dangerous-
ness, resulting in the indefinite commitment of offenders. See Horwitz, supra note 21, at 44 n. 49 (discussing
social science literature in support of over-predicting dangerousness). Exacerbating this situation is the significant
disdain for sex offenders within the psychiatric community itself, another factor which lessens the likelihood of
release. Id. See also Vernon L. Quinsey & Ann Maguire, Maximum Security Psychiatric Patients, Actuarial and
Clinical Prediction of Dangerousness, I J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 143, 145 (1986) (discussing evident inability
of professionals to accurately predict future dangerousness).
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law, and placed him in double jeopardy. The Supreme Court of Kansas reversed on
the substantive due process ground alone.45 According to the court, the SVPA's
pre-commitment requirement of "mental abnormality or personality disorder" fell
short of the Fourteenth Amendment's "substantive" requirement of "mental
illness," a constitutional minimum the Kansas court inferred from the United
States Supreme Court decisions in Addington v. Texas4 6 and Foucha v. Louisi-
ana.4 7 The SVPA, the Kansas Supreme Court reasoned, impermissibly permitted
indefinite civil confinement on what amounted to a mere finding of "dangerous-
ness," an outcome expressly prohibited by Foucha.48
The State of Kansas successfully petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for
certiorari, and the case came up for oral argument during the Fall 1996 term.49
B. The Majority's Holding
The five-member majority, in an opinion by Justice Clarence Thomas,50 con-
cluded that the SVPA passed constitutional muster in all respects. First, as to
substantive due process, the Court held that a finding of "mental illness" is not a
prerequisite for involuntary civil commitment. Contrary to the Kansas Supreme
Court's interpretation of Foucha and Addington, the majority held that the phrase
"mental illness" is "devoid of any talismanic significance," 51 and therefore the
SVPA's baseline requirements of "mental abnormality" and "personality disor-
der" were constitutionally acceptable.12 These two criteria, the Court held, ensured
that the SVPA's added requirement that an individual be "convicted of or charged
with a sexually violent offense" avoided the possibility that confinement could
arise on threat of mere "dangerousness" alone.53 As a result, the SVPA's criteria
served to "limit involuntary civil confinement to those who suffer volitional
45. See In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 138.
46. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
47. 504 U.S. 71 (1992).
48. See In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 138.
49. Not surprisingly, the Hendricks appeal drew the attention of multiple amici. Five amicus briefs were
submitted on behalf of petitioner State of Kansas (representing 20 groups and individuals, and 45 jurisdictions),
and 6 briefs were submitted on behalf of respondent and cross-petitioner Leroy Hendricks (representing 16
groups).
50. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Scalia joined in Justice Thomas's majority opinion. See
Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2075. Justice Kennedy "join[ed] the Opinion of the Court in full" and wrote separately to
"caution against dangers inherent when a civil confinement law is used in conjunction with the criminal process,
whether or not the law is given retroactive application." Id. at 2087 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
51. Id. at 2080. The Court was at pains to observe that it has "never required state legislatures to adopt any
particular nomenclature in drafting civil commitment statutes. Rather, we have traditionally left to legislators the
task of defining terms of a medical nature that have legal significance." id. at 2081. Cf Foucha, 504 U.S. at
113-14 (Thomas, I., dissenting) ("Louisiana cannot possibly extend Foucha's incarceration ... since it is
impossible to civilly commit someone who is not mentally ill.").
52. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2080-81.
53. Id.
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impairment rendering them dangerous beyond their control." 54 With the class of
persons thus "narrow[ed]," substantive due process was satisfied.5
Justice Thomas next turned to the principal question at hand: whether the
"civil" commitment provision of the SVPA constituted "punishment," making its
retroactive application as to Hendricks impermissible under the Ex Post Facto
Clause of the U.S. Constitution.56
The majority characterized the punishment question before it as being "first of
all a question of 'statutory construction,' ""7 and concluded that the SVPA was
non-punitive on two bases: first, its "placement" in the Kansas probate code; and
second, the Kansas Legislature's description of the SVPA as a "civil commitment
procedure.", 58 Under the Court's facial mode of legislative analysis, the SVPA
plainly passed muster: "Nothing on the face of the statute suggests that the
legislature sought to create anything other than a civil commitment scheme
designed to protect the public from harm." 
59
The Court next turned to the "purpose and effect" of the SVPA, acknowledging
that a " 'civil label is not always dispositive.' ,60 According to the Court, the
SVPA lacked the earmarks of a punitive scheme insofar as it did not "implicate"
the main penal goals of retribution or deterrence. It lacked retributive purpose
because it did not "affix culpability for prior criminal conduct,", 61 despite its
requirement that an individual be "convicted of or charged with a sexually violent
offense." This requirement, the Court held, was employed solely for "evidentiary
purposes, either to demonstrate that a 'mental abnormality' exists or to support a
finding of future dangerousness." 62 That the SVPA is " 'tied to criminal activity' is
'insufficient to render the [statute] punitive.' , 63
Nor did the SVPA require a finding of scienter, another hallmark of the criminal
law; rather, commitment was based on the finding that an individual had a "mental
abnormality" or "personality disorder."' 64 According to the Court, no deterrent
54. Id. at 2080.
55. Id. Justice Breyer, writing in dissent, essentially endorsed the majority's view that "mental abnormality"
was a constitutionally acceptable standard to justify involuntary civil commitment, also deferring to the rights of
states to "follow one reasonable professional view, while rejecting another." Id. at 2087-88 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
56. The ex post facto claim was before the Court as a result of Hendricks's successful cross-petition, The Court
actually granted review on both double jeopardy and ex post facto grounds. However, in the course of the Court's
adjudication of the case, the ex post facto challenge assumed predominant status. See id. at 2087 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) ("Though other issues were argued to us, as the case has matured it turns on whether the Kansas
statute is an ex post facto law.").
57. Id. at 2081 (citing Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 368 (1986)).
58. Id. at 2082.
59. Id.
60. Id. (quoting Allen, 478 U.S. at 369).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. (quoting United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 292 (1996)).
64. Id. (citing Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963)).
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purpose was served because those with a "mental abnormality" or "personality
disorder" by definition are "unlikely to be deterred by the threat of confine-
ment."
65
The Court also discounted the fact that Hendricks had been involuntarily
incapacitated by the State, another hallmark of punishment. Citing United States v.
Salerno,66 which approved the preventive detention for a limited duration of
pretrial detainees under the Bail Reform Act of 1984, the Court stated that the mere
fact that the SVPA imposed an "affirmative restraint" on Hendricks did not make
the law punitive.67 "The State may take measures to restrict the freedom of the
dangerously mentally ill. This is a legitimate non-punitive governmental objective
and has been historically so regarded.",
68
The potentially indefinite duration of Hendricks' confinement also was of no
moment. In fact, Justice Thomas reasoned that "[f] ar from any punitive objective,
the confinement's duration is instead linked to the stated purposes of the commit-
ment, namely, to hold the person until his mental abnormality no longer causes him
to be a threat to others.",69 Furthermore, because the SVPA provided for annual
review of a predator's status, "commitment was only potentially indefinite," again
indicative of a non-punitive purpose.70
Similarly, the Court rejected Hendricks' argument that the array of procedural
safeguards embodied in the SVPA, including the requirements that "predator"
status be predicated on an initial finding of probable cause, and that commitment
itself be based on proof beyond a reasonable doubt, made the SVPA punitive.
According to the Court, the procedural protections merely served to ensure that
"only a narrow class of particularly dangerous individuals" be confined under the
SVPA. 7 1 "That Kansas chose to afford such procedural protections does not
transform a civil commitment proceeding into a criminal prosecution," Justice
Thomas reasoned.72
Finally, the Court addressed Hendricks' argument that the SVPA was necessarily
punitive because it failed to ensure "treatment" for his acknowledged pedophilic
condition. The Court held that, even assuming the non-existence or inefficacy of
treatment opportunities, confinement is constitutionally acceptable when persons
"pose a danger to others," as when the State involuntarily confines "persons
afflicted with an untreatable, highly contagious disease.", 73 The Court buttressed
65. Id.
66. 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987).,






73. Id. at 2084 (citing Compagnie Francaise de Navigation a Vapeur v. Louisiana Bd. of Health, 186 U.S. 380
(1902) (holding constitutionally acceptable involuntary quarantine of persons suffering from communicable
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its conclusion with the observation that it was illogical to disallow confinement of
the dangerously insane merely because no acceptable treatment was available. In
the Court's words, "[t]o conclude otherwise would obligate a State to release
certain confined individuals who were both mentally ill and dangerous simply
because they could not be successfully treated for their afflictions."-
74
Furthermore, even presuming that Hendricks was treatable, the SVPA was
constitutional even if treatment was not its "overriding concern"; there was still




Justice Breyer, writing for the now-"liberal" block of the Court, consisting of
himself and Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, dissented from the majority's
conclusion that the SVPA did not constitute "punishment," and hence was not
violative of the Ex Post Facto Clause.76
The dissent first noted "certain resemblances" between the SVPA and "tradi-
tional criminal punishments," 7' but found the historical connections insufficient in
themselves to render the SVPA "punitive" in design or effect. 78 However, because
"important features of the Act point[ed] in opposite directions," Justice Breyer
urged, the Court was obliged to place "particular importance upon those features
that would likely distinguish between a basically punitive and a basically nonpuni-
tive purpose." 
79
Under this view, the question deserving particular attention was whether the
diseases). The majority's position on this question tracks the view earlier advanced by the California courts. See
Hubbart v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 268, 282 (1996) (construing California Sexually Violent Predator Act,
stating: "There is no constitutional requirement that commitment be based on amenability to treatment.").
74. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2084.
75. Id. Justice Thomas offered the fact that "somewhat meager" treatment was available to Hendricks could
perhaps be explained by the SVPA being in its early stages of implementation. Id. at 2085.
76. As noted supra note 55, Justice Breyer did not dissent from the majority's conclusion that the SVPA
satisfied substantive due process notwithstanding its failure to incorporate a "mental illness" standard. Justices
Stevens and Souter joined in this conclusion. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2087-90 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice
Ginsburg, however, expressly elected not to join the dissent on this point, while still agreeing with the other
dissenters that the SVPA violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. Id.
77. Id. at 2090. The dissent noted several such "resemblances": most significantly, offenders are "secure[ly]"
confined, a traditional aim of the criminal law; only those previously convicted are targeted; such confinement
occurs through the efforts of criminal justice system actors; and criminal law procedural guarantees and standards
of proof are employed. Id. at 2090-91.
78. See id. at 2091. For instance, the dissent characterized as unimportant that "criminal behavior triggers the
Act." This requirement served to "screen[] out those whose past behavior does not concretely demonstrate the
existence of a mental problem or future potential danger." As did the majority, Justice Breyer concluded that a
conviction might serve an important noncriminal "evidentiary purpose." Id. Cf Dep't of Revenue v. Kurth
Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 781 (1994) (deeming it significant a "so-called tax is conditioned on the commission of a
crime," and finding requirement indicative of punitive intent).
79. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2091 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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provision evidenced a "concern for treatment." This therapeutic concern domi-
nated the Court's analysis in Allen v. Illinois,80 itself relied upon by the Hendricks
majority. According to Justice Breyer:
The Allen Court's focus upon treatment, as a kind of touchstone helping to
distinguish civil from punitive purposes, is not surprising, for one would
expect a nonpunitive statutory scheme to confine, not simply in order to
protect, but also in order to cure ... [A] statutory scheme that provides
confinement that does not reasonably fit a practically available, medically
oriented treatment objective, more likely reflects a primarily punitive legisla-
tive purpose.8
1
Applying this standard, Justice Breyer found several reasons to infer punitive
purpose. First, the Kansas Supreme Court itself had determined that treatment was
not a significant objective under the SVPA, a matter of record which he scolded the
majority for ignoring.82 Second, that Kansas designed the SVPA to provide
"treatment" only after offenders completed their criminal sentences made clear
that the State did not view treatment as an important objective. 83 Furthermore, as
of the time of Hendricks's commitment, Kansas had neither taken the necessary
fiscal and practical steps to affect treatment, nor provided Hendricks with any
treatment for his condition.84 Third, the SVPA's failure to require the consideration
of a less restrictive intervention (such as a halfway house) militated in favor of a
punitive purpose.8 5 Finally, of the seventeen other states with similar involuntary
commitment statutes, only Kansas had the dual characteristics of delaying treat-
ment and failing to offer a less restrictive placement, at least when such a
post-confinement measure was imposed retroactively.
86
On these bases, the dissent concluded that the SVPA was not "simply an effort
to commit Hendricks civilly, but rather an effort to inflict further punishment upon
him" in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause.8 7
80. 478 U.S. 364 (1986).
81. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2092 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
82. See id. at 2092-93.
83. See id. at 2093-94.
84. See id. at 2093. Support for this latter point, not insignificant to the dissent's analysis, was a source of sharp
dispute between the majority and dissent. According to the dissent, the only evidence that Hendricks was
receiving treatment came from sources external to the record (a statement by the Kansas Attorney General at oral
argument and a footnote contained in a state habeas corpus proceeding nearly a year after Hendricks was
committed). Justice Breyer condemned the majority's use of the extraneous information, even if reliable. Id.
Moreover, he added, even if considered, such information nonetheless showed that Kansas was not providing
treatment to Hendricks. Id.
85. See id. at 2094.
86. See id. at 2095. Justice Breyer noted that Iowa alone delayed civil commitment (and hence treatment) and
failed to explicitly consider less restrictive alternatives. Iowa, however, only applied its provision prospectively.
Id.
87. See id. at 2088.
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Inl. THE PLACE OF THE Ex POST FACTO CLAUSE IN AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
A. History and Origins of the Ex Post Facto Clause
The Framers of the U.S. Constitution adopted the Ex Post Facto Clause to
protect future Americans against oppressive, retroactively imposed, legislative
enactments. The enduring prominence of the Clause stems as much from its
location in Article I, a position otherwise reserved for structural issues of broad
democratic governance, as from its emphatic prohibition: "No state shall.., pass
any ... ex post facto law.",
88
The Supreme Court's classic interpretation of the Clause came in the 1798 case
of Calder v. Bull,89 where Justice Chase characterized the types of laws encom-
passed within the prohibition:
1st. Every law that makes an action, done before the passing of the law, and
which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action. 2nd.
Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when
committed. 3rd. Every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater
punishment, than the law annexed to the punishment, than the law annexed to
the crime, when committed. 4th. Every law that alters the legal rules of
evidence, and receives less, or different, testimony, than the law required at the
time of the commission of the offense, in order to convict the offender.90
In the Civil War era, the Court stated the goal of the Clause more succinctly as
barring any law "which imposes a punishment for an act which was not punishable
at the time it was committed; or imposes additional punishment to that then
prescribed . .. ."91a
Pronouncements attending the adoption of the Constitution make clear the
Framers' near obsessive concern over the threat of retroactively-designed laws.
Mindful of the excesses of Parliament, not to mention colonial governments,9 2
James Madison proclaimed that "ex post facto laws ... are contrary to the first
principles of the social compact, and to every principle of sound legislation.",
93
88. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. The Framers highlighted their profound concern over ex post facto
lawmaking by also prohibiting ex post facto laws by Congress. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. Concern over
retroactive legislation is evident elsewhere in Article I, which also prohibits bills of attainder in two different
sections. See U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (as to Congress); art. I, § 10, cl. I (as to States).
89. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
90. Id. at 390.
91. Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 325-26 (1867).
92. The early annals of the Republic contain ample evidence of the Framers' concern over unfair retroactive
law-making in the newly independent political bodies. See Thompson v. Carr, 5 N.H. 510 (1831); Johnson v.
Gratz, 2 Johns. Cas. (N.Y.) 248 (1806); Republica v. Gordon, I U.S. (1 Dall.) 233 (Pa. 1788). See also Alison
Reppy, The Spectre of Attainder in New York, 23 ST. JOHN'S L. Rav. 1 (1948); James W. Thompson, Anti-loyalist
Legislation During the American Revolution, 3 ILL. L. Rav. 81 (1908).
93. Tin FEDERALIST No. 44, at 282 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). Justice Story echoed this
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Fellow-Federalist Alexander Hamilton considered the bar against ex post facto
laws among the three "greate[st] securities to liberty and republicanism [the
Constitution] contains." 94
The basis for the Framers' antipathy was two-fold. First, ex post facto laws are
especially unfair because they deprive citizens of notice of the wrongfulness of
behavior, and thus result in unjust deprivations. The Clause therefore ensures that
legislative acts "give fair warning of their effect and permit individuals to rely on
their meaning until explicitly changed.", 95 Such notice, the Court has repeatedly
asserted, is of particular importance in the context of the criminal law, where the
deprivations-and hence potential unfairness-are greatest. 96 "IF]air warning of
that conduct that will give rise to criminal penalties is fundamental to our concept
of constitutional liberty." 9 7 Very recently the Court stated:
[T]he presumption against retroactive legislation is deeply rooted in our
jurisprudence, and embodies a legal doctrine centuries older than our Repub-
lic. Elementary considerations of fairness dictate that individuals should have
an opportunity to know what the law is and to conform their conduct
accordingly; settled expectations should not be lightly disrupted.98
The second but certainly no less significant concern giving rise to the Clause
same sentiment: "[r]etrospective laws ... neither accord with sound legislation nor with the fundamental
principles of the social compact." 2 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 1398
(Melville M. Bigelow ed., 1994).
94. THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 511 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
95. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28-29 (1981).
96. See Ursery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 17 (1976). Since its decision in Calder v. Bull in
1798, the Court has adhered to its view that the Clause applies only to penal laws. Over the years, however, some
have questioned whether the Clause, at its origin, focused exclusively on penal enactments. See, e.g., I WILLIAM
W. CROSSKEY & WILLIAM JEFFREY, JR., POLITICS AND THE CONSTIUrTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
324-51 (1953). But see Michael W. McConnell, The Importance of Humility in Judicial Review: A Comment on
Ronald Dworkin's A "Moral Reading" of the Constitution, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 1269, 1280 n.54 (1997) (arguing
persuasively on the basis of the Constitutional Convention annals that Framers' original intent was to apply
Clause only as to "criminal" matters). This historical debate appears to be of scant contemporary moment, at any
rate, for as the Court has noted: "It would be an unjustifiable reversal to overturn a view of the Constitution so
deeply rooted and so consistently adhered to." Galven v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 532 n.4 (1953).
97. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 191 (1977). Justice Scalia has characterized the proscription against
retroactive punishment as "timeless and universal," and traces its origin to the time of the Greeks. See Kaiser
Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 855 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring).
98. Landgraf v. United States, 511 U.S. 244, 265 (1994) (footnotes omitted). Professor Harold Krent offers
several interesting arguments about notice in the civil versus criminal spheres, arguing that such concerns actually
are greater in the civil. See Harold J. Krent, The Puzzling Boundary Between Criminal and Civil Retroactive
Lawmaking, 84 GEO. L.J. 2143, 2159-65 (1996). He asserts, for instance, that notice is really a "fiction" because
few people have notice of the complex body of laws in our highly regulated society, and that civil society has a
greater "reliance interest" because of financial concerns, and hence arguably suffers greater harm with retroactive
lawmaking. At the same time, however, Professor Krent concedes that retroactive lawmaking threatens a greater
"liberty interest" in the criminal context, id. at 2165-66, and ultimately acknowledges that retroactive criminal
laws are especially troublesome because of the relative political disempowerment of those typically charged with
crimes. Id. at 2183. This latter recognition, of course, is the second motivating concern behind the Clause, as
discussed infra, note 98 and accompanying text.
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was the fear of arbitrary and vindictive lawmaking.99 Madison highlighted the
Framers' concern: "[t]he sober people of America are weary of the fluctuating
policy which has directed the public councils. They have seen with regret and
indignation, that sudden changes and legislative interferences ... become jobs in
the hands of enterprising and influential speculators .... .'0 Hamilton wrote:
"Nothing is more common than for a free people, in times of heat and violence, to
gratify momentary passions, by letting into the government principles and prece-
dents which afterwards prove fatal to themselves." 1
0
'
In Calder v. Bull,10 2 Chief Justice John Marshall shared an equally suspicious
view of retroactive legislation and the questionable motives and political forces
that can give rise to it:
With very few exceptions, the advocates of such laws were stimulated by
ambition, or personal resentment, and vindictive malice. To prevent such, and
similar, acts of violence and injustice, I believe, the Federal and State
Legislatures, were prohibited from passing any bill of attainder, or any ex post
facto law. 1
0 3
Almost ten years later, in Fletcher v. Peck,'°4 Marshall noted:
Whatever respect might have been felt for the state sovereignties, it is not to be
disguised that the framers of the constitution viewed, with some apprehension,
the violent acts which might grow out of the feelings of the moment .. .The
restrictions on the legislative power of the states are obviously founded in this
sentiment; and the constitution of the United States contains what may be
deemed a bill of rights for the people of each state.'
0 5
In short, the Ex Post Facto Clause was designed to guard against the Framers'
fears of retroactive penal laws forged by "hot-blooded" legislatures, laws that
deprive Americans of notice that particular behavior is wrongful and/or serve to
subject them to vindictive or arbitrary sanctions retroactive in their effect. '0 6
B. The Court's Interpretation of the Ex Post Facto Clause
The Court has applied the Clause relatively infrequently since its origin, most
often, as Chief Justice Marshall noted, in response to legislative enactment
99. Weaver, 450 U.S. at 29.
100. THE FEDERALIST, No. 44, at 351 (James Madison) (Hamilton ed., 1880).
101. JOHN C. HAMILTON, HISTORY OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES 34 (1859).
102. 3 U.S. (3 Dail.) 386 (1798).
103. Id. at 389.
104. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
105. Id. at 137-38 (emphasis added). For a more modem articulation of this ageless concern, see City of
Richmond v. JA. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989), where Justice Stevens wrote, "the constitutional prohibitions
against the enactment of ex post facto laws and bills of attainder reflect a valid concern about the use of the
political process to punish or characterize past conduct of private citizens." J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 513
(Stevens, J., concurring).
106. For an early but comprehensive treatment of the seminal case law see Breck P. McAllister, Ex Post Facto
Laws in the Supreme Court of the United States, 15 CAL. L. REv. 269 (1927).
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directed towards maligned persons "of the moment." 07 Thus, for example, the
Court has addressed ex post facto challenges to retroactive legislation resulting in
deportations on the basis of political sympathies during "red scares," 108 changes
in resident alien status during times of ethnic distrust,'0 9 and revocation of
professional privileges enjoyed by those sympathetic to the cause of the Confed-
eracy in the wake of the Civil War."0
In keeping with this central concern for legislative bias, the Court's ex post facto
decisions have been marked by a predominant desire to divine legislative intent
and purpose."t ' For instance, in DeVeau v. Braisted,t l2 on ex post facto grounds,
union officials challenged the New York Waterfront Act, which effectively pre-
vented convicted felons from working for the New York waterfront unions. "' The
Court closely scrutinized the legislative record pertaining to the Act and concluded
that Congress intended to regulate the waterfront, not punish ex-felons. 1 4 The
Court characterized its ex post facto inquiry as follows:
The mark of an ex post facto law is the imposition of what can fairly be
designated punishment for past acts. The question in each case where unpleas-
ant consequences are brought to bear upon an individual for prior conduct, is
whether the legislative aim was to punish that individual for past activity, or
whether the restriction of the individual comes about as a relevant incident to a
regulation of a present situation, such as the proper qualifications for a
profession." 5
In Trop v. Dulles,' 16 the Court characterized the determination of legislative
purpose as dispositive:
Each time a statute has been challenged as being in conflict with the
constitutional prohibitions against bills of attainder and ex post facto laws, it
107. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 138 (1810).
108. See Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1953). See also Warren v. United States Parole Comm'n, 659 F.2d 183,
186-87 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (stating that "[Jour understanding of the basis of the prohibition against ex post facto
laws has changed remarkably little since [1798] .... From the outset, then, the ex post facto clauses have been
understood to have been principally aimed at curtailing legislative abuses.").
109. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
110. See Exparte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1867); Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867).
111. See Doe v. Pataki, 120 F.3d 1263, 1273 (2d Cir. 1997) ("Since at least 1898, the Supreme Court has
focused upon the intent underlying the enactment of, or the end served by, the challenged sanction as the
touchstone of the ex post facto analysis."), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 1066 (1998).
112. 363 U.S. 144 (1960).
113. Id. at 153-54.
114. Id. at 160.
115. Id. (emphasis added). In Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189 (1898), a physician convicted of a felony in
1878 (performing an abortion) asserted that he had been impermissibly "punished" as a result of a law passed in
1893 that barred him from practicing medicine on the basis of his felony conviction. The Court rejected the
physician's ex post facto challenge, concluding that the "state [was] not seeking to further punish a criminal, but
rather only to protect its citizens from physicians of bad character." Hawker, 170 U.S. at 196.
116. 356U.S. 56(1958).
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has been necessary to determine whether a penal law was involved .... The
controlling nature of such statutes normally depends on the evident purpose of
the legislature. 1
17
Similarly, the Court's seminal ex post facto opinions have evinced a great
sensitivity for legislative context-heeding the political climate at the time the
legislation originated. In the 1866 case of Cummings v. Missouri, 18 for example,
the Court addressed a provision of the Missouri Constitution, newly amended just
after the Civil War, that conditioned the holding of specified public offices, and
participation in religious and legal occupations upon the taking of a "loyalty oath"
attesting, inter alia, that the individual had "been truly and loyally on the side of
the United States against all enemies thereof, foreign and domestic ... ,,119 A
Roman Catholic priest indicted for preaching without first having taken the loyalty
oath sued, claiming that the retroactive application of the provision was impermis-
sible on ex post facto and bill of attainder grounds. The Court agreed, making plain
its concern for the legislative context in which the oath requirement arose:
The counsel for Missouri closed his argument in this case by presenting a
striking picture of the struggle for ascendency in that State during the recent
Rebellion between the friends and enemies of the Union, and of the fierce
passions which that struggled aroused. It was in the midst of the struggle that
the present constitution was framed, although it was not adopted by the people
until the war had closed. It would have been strange, therefore, had it not
exhibited in its provisions some traces of the excitement amidst which the
[constitutional] convention held its deliberations. It was against the excited
action of the States, under such influences as these, that the framers of the
Federal Constitution intended to guard. 1
20
The Cummings Court emphasized the essential role of legislative purpose and
context: "The deprivation of any rights, civil or political, previously enjoyed, may
be punishment, the circumstances attending and the causes of the deprivation
determining this fact." 
121
In short, the Court has insisted that in seeking to determine whether a given
"legislative aim was to punish" for ex post facto purposes, the statutory provision
in question must "be placed in the context of the structure and history of the
legislation of which it is a part."' 122 Echoing Chief Justice Marshall's concern in
117. Id. at 96 (emphasis added).
118. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 322. The Court used an identical analysis that same term in Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333,
378 (1867), to strike down on ex post facto grounds a similar loyalty oath that barred appellant, who had served in
high-ranking Confederate political positions, from practicing law.
121. Cummings, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 320.
122. DeVeau, 363 U.S. at 147.
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Calder v. Bull 12 3 in 1798, the second Justice Harlan commented on the skepticism
the Court should normally employ in the ex post facto context:
[T]he policy of the prohibition against ex post facto legislation would seem to
rest on the apprehension that the legislature in imposing penalties on past
conduct ... may be acting with a purpose not to prevent dangerous conduct
generally but to impose by legislation a penalty against specific persons or
classes of persons. 1
24
Before the protections of the Clause can be triggered, however, the Court must
first establish that the legislative enactment constitutes "punishment." The imper-
missible ex post facto effect of a law is not diminished, or disguised, by lending a
civil or remedial form to that which is "essentially criminal." 125 The Court's effort
to develop a reliable constitutional framework for this quest is addressed next.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PUNISHMENT QUESTION
Whether a given legislative enactment imposes "punishment" is a matter of
threshold constitutional significance, potentially triggering not just the protections
of the Ex Post Facto Clause, but also those of a broad array of other constitutional
provisions as well.' 26 Despite this importance, the Supreme Court's case law on
the punishment question in recent times has been so inconsistent that it borders on
the unintelligible,1 27 evidencing a decidedly circular, at times patently result-
driven effort to distinguish whether a sanction is "civil" or "criminal," "preven-
tive" or "punitive," "regulatory" or "retributive." 128
123. 3 U.S. (3 DalI) 386 (1798).
124. James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 247 n.3 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). See also Ho Ah Kow v. Nunan, 12 F Cas. 252, 256 (C.D. Cal. 1879) (Field, J., sitting on circuit) ("When we
take our seats on the bench we are not struck with blindness, and forbidden to know as judges what we see as
men.").
125. Burgess v. Salmon, 97 U.S. (7 Otto) 381, 385 (1878).
126. See, e.g., United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267 (1996) (Double Jeopardy Clause); Austin v. United States,
509 U.S. 602 (1993) (Excessive Fines Clause of Eighth Amendment); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739
(1987) (Due Process Clause of Fifth Amendment); United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965) (Bill of Attainder
Clause); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963) (Fifth and Sixth Amendments); Trop v. Dulles, 356
U.S. 86 (1958) (Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of Eighth Amendment).
127. Justice Marshall commented on this state of affairs in United States v. Salerno, where, after the majority
characterized pretrial detention as "regulatory," and hence not violative of due process, he surmised: "The
majority's technique for infringing this right is simple: merely redefine any measure which is claimed to be
punishment as 'regulation,' and, magically, the Constitution no longer prohibits its imposition .... [T]he
majority's argument is merely an exercise in obfuscation." United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 760 (1987)
(Marshall, J., dissenting). See generally J. Morris Clark, Civil and Criminal Penalties and Forfeitures: A
Framework for Constitutional Analysis, 60 MINN. L. REv. 379,392-97 (1976) (surveying the Court's inconsistent
theoretical approaches on the punishment question).
128. Not surprisingly, this lack of clarity is evident in the opinions of the lower courts as well. See, e.g., Doe v.
Pataki, 120 F.3d 1263, 1272 (2d Cir. 1997) (" 'Punishment'-along with its many cognates and synonyms, for
instance, 'penal,' 'punitive,' 'penalty,' and 'criminal'-is an imprecise concept with meanings that vary
depending on the purpose for which the concept is defined."), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1066 (1998); Artway v. New
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Over the past thirty-five years, the justices have enunciated and applied
numerous tests on the punishment question. 129 Only very recently did the Court
resolve that the answer to whether a particular sanction is "punishment," at
bottom, should be driven by the identity of the particular constitutional challenge
before the Court. 130 As will be discussed shortly, this recognition itself is
important, permitting at last the beginnings of a more reasoned and reliable basis
on which to resolve cases. In the meantime, however, it is instructive to examine
the tests the Court has used in recent times to resolve the "punishment question."
A. Mendoza-Martinez and the Transformation of the Punishment Question
In 1963, in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez,13 1 the Court struck down on Fifth
and Sixth Amendment grounds, federal statutes that divested individuals of their
U.S. citizenship when such individuals departed from or remained outside of the
country for the purpose of evading the military draft. 132 The Court held that such
proceedings were "criminal" in nature and invalidated the statutes because they
failed to provide the panoply of constitutional procedural safeguards available to
citizens in criminal matters, including the right to jury trial, to confront witnesses,
and to enjoy the assistance of counsel. 133 In reaching its decision, the Court
identified seven "relevant" factors that-in the absence of "conclusive" legisla-
tive intent of a punitive purpose-can be considered:
[1] Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, [2]
whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, [3] whether it comes
Jersey, 81 F.3d 1235, 1242 (3d Cir. 1996) (stating that "the law on 'punishment' is complicated and in some
disarray."); United States v. All Assets of G.P.S. Automotive Corp., 66 E3d 483, 491 (2d Cir. 1995) ("[Tlhe
appropriate inquiry is no longer whether the particular forfeiture in the case at hand is remedial or punitive, but
whether the statute upon which the Government relies for the forfeiture is itself remedial or punitive."). See also
LUDWiG WIrrGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 138-242 (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 1958) (1953)
(postulating the futility of definitional ventures because, in the end, words are devoid of intrinsic meaning). Cf.
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 232 (1824) ("One-half the doubts in life arise from the defects of
language.").
129. This incoherence, however, is not without possible excuse. At least in part the disarray results from the
fact that, in the Court's words, "[tlhe notion of punishment, as we commonly understand it, cuts across the
division between the civil and criminal law." United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 447.-48 (1989). Further
complicating matters is the reality that "sanctions frequently serve more than one purpose," Austin v. United
States, U.S. 602, 610 (1993), making it all the more difficult to say with certainty whether a given sanction is
"punishment." The modem impulse to impose quasi-criminal sanctions has complicated matters still further. See,
e.g., Mann, supra note 32; William J. Stuntz, Substance, Process, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEG.
IssuEs 1 (1996). As Stephen Schulhofer has observed, "[t]he Framers, for all their prescience, did not anticipate
post-modernism. They apparently thought they knew what the 'criminal' process was." Stephen J. Schulhofer,
Two Systems of Social Protection: Comments on the Civil-Criminal Distinction, With Particular Reference to
Sexually Violent Predator Laws, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL Iss. 69, 78-79 (1996).
130. See infra notes 157-166 and accompanying text.
131. 372 U.S. 144(1963).
132. Id. at 165-66.
133. Id. at 167.
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into play only on a finding of scienter, [4] whether its operation will promote
the traditional aims of punishment-retribution or deterrence, [5] whether the
behavior to which it applies is already a crime, [6] whether an alternative
purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and [7]
whether it appears excessive in relation to the.., inquiry .... 134
However, because the Court found "conclusive" proof in the legislative history of
punitive intent on the part of Congress,1 35 the Court did not examine the seven
factors, which the Court admitted "often point in differing directions." 36
The Mendoza-Martinez factors over the years have been applied in a highly
selective and ultimately inconsistent manner. 137 The Court itself has stated that the
factors are "neither exclusive nor dispositive"' 38 and the factors have been
manipulated to the point of "lack[ing] any real content." 139 Commentators have
condemned the Mendoza-Martinez factors as being so "open-ended" as to be
meaningless. 4' Indeed, to this day, the Court has yet to brand a nominally civil
sanction as criminal pursuant to the Mendoza-Martinez factors.141
The next significant development in the case law came in 1989, in United States
v. Halper,142 where the Court addressed whether the Fifth Amendment's Double
Jeopardy Clause was violated when the manager of a medical laboratory was
assessed a $130,000 fine after first being convicted of Medicare fraud and
sentenced to two years imprisonment and a $5,000 fine. 143 The Court decided that
"punishment" had been twice imposed, focusing on the "effect" or "excessive-
134. Id. at 168-69.
135. Id. at 169.
136. Id.
137. See, e.g., United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1980) (examining only one factor, the fifth, and concluding
that a statute permitting a "civil penalty" for water pollution was not punitive, barring invocation of the Fifth
Amendment guarantee against self-incrimination). Not surprisingly, the varied applications of the Mendoza-
Martinez factors have resulted in contradictory constitutional findings relating to similar statutory provisions. The
most recent example of these contradictions can be found with respect to the various formulations of "Megan's
Law." See, e.g., Doe v. Pataki, 940 F. Supp. 603 (S.D.N.Y 1996) (finding notification provision of New York law
punitive), rev'd, 120 F.3d 1263 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1066 (1998); Rowe v. Burton, 884 F. Supp.
1372 (D. Alaska 1994) (holding community notification provision of Alaska's law punitive and hence violative of
Ex Post Facto Clause), dismissed sub nom., Doe I v. Burton, 85 F.3d 635 (9th Cir. 1996); Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d
367 (N.J. 1995) (finding notification provision of New Jersey law nonpunitive); State v. Ward, 869 P.2d 1062
(Wash. 1994) (en banc) (holding Washington law nonpunitive); State v. Noble, 829 P.2d 1217 (Ariz. 1992) (en
banc) (finding sex offender registration requirement of Arizona law nonpunitive); In re Reed, 663 P.2d 216 (Cal.
1983) (en banc) (holding California registration requirement punitive).
138. United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 249 (1980).
139. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 565 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also Opinion of the Justices to the
Senate, 668 N.E.2d 738, 750 (Mass. 1996) ("[W]ithout some indication of the weight and priority of these
[Mendoza-Martinez] factors, however, that test risks an unmanageable indefiniteness.").
140. See Cheh, supra note 33, at 1358 ("Although [the Mendoza-Martinez test] has been invoked repeatedly, it
is doubtful whether the Court is prepared to apply it seriously .... ).
141. See Gregory Y. Porter, Note, Uncivil Punishment. The Supreme Court's Ongoing Struggle with
Constitutional Limits on Punitive Civil Sanctions, 70 S. CAL. L. REv. 517, 557 (1997).
142. 490 U.S. 435 (1989), abrogated by Hudson v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 488 (1997).
143. Halper, 490 U.S. at 435.
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ness" of the sanction.44 The Court stated:
While recourse to statutory language, structure, and intent is appropriate in
identifying the inherent nature of a proceeding, or in determining the constitu-
tional safeguards that must accompany those proceedings as a general matter,
[such an] approach is not well suited to the context of the "humane interests"
safeguarded by the Double Jeopardy Clause's proscription of multiple punish-
ments. 
145
In reaching its result the Court at once disavowed any mechanistic definition of
punishment 146 and the need for any threshold inquiry into legislative design and
purpose, focusing instead on the impact a given sanction has upon the targeted
individual: "[Fifth Amendment] protection is intrinsically personal. Its violation
can be identified only by assessing the character of the actual sanctions imposed on
the individual by the machinery of the state." 1
47
144. The penalty under the False Claims Act amounted to 220 times the damages actually suffered by the
government. Id. at 441. On this basis, the fine bore "no rational relation" to the putative remedial purpose-
compensating the government for its costs. Id. at 449.
145. Id. at 447.
146. The Court stated:
Simply put, a civil as well as a criminal sanction constitutes punishment when the sanction as
applied in the individual case serves the goals of punishment. These goals are familiar. We have
recognized in other contexts that punishment serves the twin aims of retribution and deterrence.
Id. at 448.
The Court elaborated that a civil sanction is punishment if it "cannot be fairly said solely to serve a remedial
purpose, but rather can be explained only as also serving either retributive or deterrent purposes." Id. (emphasis
added). The patent circularity of this pronouncement conflicted with the Court's recognition that "[t]he notion of
punishment, as we commonly understand it, cuts across the division between the civil and criminal law." Id. at
447-48.
Halper, since its issuance, has been harshly criticized. See, e.g., Linda S. Eads, Separating Crime From
Punishment: The Constitutional Implications of United States v. Halper, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 929, 952 (1990)
(arguing that Halper "extended the concept of double jeopardy protection beyond recognition, and in doing so
created a new doctrine that courts and litigants will find difficult to confine."). Early in its 1997-1998 term, the
Court expressly disavowed the approach adopted in Halper, substituting the test used in United States v. Ward,
448 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1980), another case arising under the Fifth Amendment. See Hudson v. United States, 118
S. Ct. 488, 494 (1997) (stating that "Halper's deviation from longstanding double jeopardy principles was ill
considered" and, as established by subsequent cases, "unworkable"). Hudson is discussed at length infra notes
161-70 and accompanying text.
147. Halper, 490 U.S. at 447. Justice Frankfurter elsewhere expressed similar disenchantment with the use of
"labels" when the "humane interests" of the Double Jeopardy Clause were on the line:
The argument seems to runs thus: Double jeopardy means attempting to punish criminally twice;
this is not an attempt to punish criminally because it is a civil proceeding; it is a civil proceeding
because, as a matter of "statutory construction," it is a "civil sanction" which is being enforced
here; and the sanction is "civil" because it is "remedial" and not "punitive" in nature. Such
dialectical subtleties may serve well enough for purposes of explaining away uncritical language
in earlier cases .... But they are too subtle when the problem is one of safeguarding the humane
interests for the protection of which the double jeopardy clause was written into the Fifth
Amendment.
United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 553-54 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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Four years later, in Austin v. United States,148 the Court staked out yet another
analytic position on the punishment question, this time with respect to the Eighth
Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause regarding in rem civil forfeitures. In Austin,
the Court held that application of the Mendoza-Martinez factors should be limited
to the constitutional context in which that case arose, namely, one asking whether
Petitioner in effect faced a "criminal prosecution," warranting invocation of Fifth
and Sixth Amendment procedural protections. 149 The Austin Court went on to state
that "[i]n addressing the separate question of whether punishment is being
imposed, the Court has not employed the test[] articulated in Mendoza-Martinez
,,150
Because the Austin Court had before it a claim sounding in the Eighth
Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause, and the Court was not concerned with the
nature of the proceeding for Fifth and Sixth Amendment purposes, the Mendoza-
Martinez factors did not apply. Instead, consistent with its Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence more generally,1 5 1 the Court undertook an extended analysis of
whether forfeiture, in both an historical and a contemporary sense, has been
conceived as punishment. 1 52 According to Austin, a measure that has historically
served a punitive role is punishment unless the statutory text or legislative history
establish a contrary conclusion. 153
One year later, in Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 54 the Court was
asked whether the Double Jeopardy Clause barred the State of Montana from
assessing a tax for marijuana possession after Montana had imposed a criminal
conviction for the same conduct. The Court backed away from the strict historical
approach employed in Austin, concluding that the Montana tax was "punitive"
because it was more than eight times the market value of the marijuana seized.' 55
The Court proceeded to note other "unusual features" of the tax, each militating in
favor of deeming the tax punitive: (1) the tax was conditioned on the arrest for the
crime giving rise to the tax and (2) the tax was levied on goods the taxpayer neither
owned nor possessed when the tax was imposed. 5
6
148. 509 U.S. 602 (1993).
149. Id. at 610 n.6.
150. Id.
151. See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 965 (1991) (stating that proportionality analysis dedicates
"particular attention to the background of the Eighth Amendment ... and to the understanding of the Eighth
Amendment before the end of the nineteenth century"); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (same).
152. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 610-11. The Court's opinion focused on historic views of forfeiture, considering
the contemporary status of forfeiture only in terms of the "legislative history" of the two federal forfeiture
provisions at issue. Id.
153. See id. at 619.
154. 511 U.S. 767 (1994).
155. Seeid. at 780.
156. See id. at 783. Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens concluded: "Taken as a whole, this drug tax is a
concoction of anomalies, too far-removed from a standard assessment to escape characterization as punishment
for the purpose of Double Jeopardy analysis." Id. at 783 (footnote omitted).
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The punishment question took yet another turn in 1996 when the Court in
United States v. Ursery157 considered whether in rem forfeiture following criminal
prosecution constituted double jeopardy. The Court answered in the negative and
articulated a two-pronged test, asking: One, "whether Congress intended [the]
proceedings ... to be criminal or civil"; and two, whether under the seven-factor
Mendoza-Martinez test "the proceedings are so punitive in fact as to 'persuade us
that the forfeiture proceeding[s] may not legitimately be viewed as civil in nature,'
despite Congress's intent." ' "
To reach its result, however, the Court needed to somehow distinguish Austin,
which also involved in rem forfeiture. The Court accomplished this by limiting
Austin's historical ("categorical") mode of analysis to the constitutional context in
which it arose, the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment, "a
constitutional provision which we never have understood as parallel to, or even
related to, the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment."'159 The Court
hastened to provide the following provision-specific assessment of its recent
decisions on the punishment question.:
Halper dealt with in personam civil penalties under the Double Jeopardy
Clause; Kurth Ranch with a tax proceeding under the Double Jeopardy Clause;
and Austin with civil forfeitures under the Excessive Fines Clause. None of
these cases dealt with the subject of this case: in rem civil forfeitures for
purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause. 160
The Court's most recent decision on the punishment question, Hudson v. United
States,16 ' handed down in December 1997, reaffirms the Court's announced fealty
to constitutional context. Hudson concerned a double jeopardy challenge against
both a criminal indictment and a monetary fine imposed in response to banking
improprieties. 62 The Court renounced the test it had announced in Halper, also a
double jeopardy case. 163 According to the Hudson Court, Halper had "deviated
from [the Court's] traditional double jeopardy doctrine.. .. ,"' 64 Halper's focus on
''excessiveness" was replaced by the dual intent-effects test enunciated in United
States v. Ward, ' 65 another Fifth Amendment case, which itself incorporated the test
157. 518 U.S. 267 (1996).
158. Id. at 288. The Court related that this approach derived from three "remarkably consistent" (citation
omitted) prior decisions concerning civil in rem forfeiture, all arising in the double jeopardy context: United
States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354 (1984); One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409
U.S. 232 (1972) (per curiam); and Various Items of Personal Property v. United States, 282 U.S. 577 (1931).
Ursery, 518 U.S. at 288. The Ursery Court's two-pronged focus corresponded to that articulated in 89 Firearms,
an approach the Court characterized as "more refined, perhaps" than that used "in Various Items." Id. at 278.
159. ld. at 286.
160. Id. at 288.
161. 118 S. Ct. 488 (1997).
162. See id. at 491-92.
163. See id. at 494.
164. Id.
165. 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1980). Although not expressly saying so, the Hudson Court's newly announced
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of Mendoza -Martinez (a Fifth and Sixth Amendment Case). Concurring in the
result, Justice Souter noted: "we have already recognized that Halper's standards
for identifying what is criminally punitive under the Fifth Amendment needed
revision.., and there is obvious sense in employing common criteria to point up
the criminal nature for purposes of both the Fifth and Sixth Amendments." 1
66
Significantly absent from Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court in
Hudson is any mention whatsoever of Hendricks, decided a mere six months
before.
B. The Hendricks Court's Misdirected Inquiry
Viewed in terms of the Court's recent cases on the punishment question,
Hendricks is an anomaly. A narrow question was before the Court: did the
involuntary civil commitment component of the SVPA constitute "punishment,"
in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause? As in virtually all of the Court's modem
decisions on the punishment question, the Court framed its quest as being one of
"statutory construction,"' 167 but examination of the Court's analysis reveals
several fundamental problems.
1. The Court's Acontextual Inquiry
As noted, the Court's recent decisions on the "punishment question," most
notably in Ursery,t 68 Austin,' 69 and Hudson,170 highlight an acute sensitivity for
constitutional context, placing a heavy emphasis on the functional role played by
the given constitutional provision at issue. This approach is neither new nor novel.
Historically, the Court has admonished that the applicability of a particular
test for double jeopardy purposes closely resembles the "intent-effects" announced in Ursery, 518 U.S. 267
(1996), another double jeopardy case.
166. Hudson, 118 S. Ct. at 500 (Souter, J., concurring) (citing several Fifth Amendment punishment question
cases as well as Mendoza-Martinez, which involved Fifth and Sixth Amendment claims). See also Ward, 448 U.S.
at 248 (discussing the mutual concern of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments over "criminal" versus "civil"
penalties).
The Hudson Court's new double jeopardy test draws on that stated in United States v. Ward, which first asks
"whether the legislature, 'in establishing the penalizing mechanism, indicated either expressly or impliedly a
preference for one label or another.' "Hudson, 118 S. Ct. at 493 (citing Ward, 448 U.S. at 248). Hudson goes on to
assert that "[elven in those cases where the legislature has indicated an intention to establish a civil penalty, we
have inquired further whether the statutory scheme was so punitive either in purpose or effect" to transform the
ostensibly civil sanction into a penal one. Id. (citing Ward, 448 U.S. at 248-49 and using the Mendoza-Martinez
factors to make this latter determination). Finally, only the "clearest proof" will "override legislative intent and
transform a denominated civil penalty into a criminal penalty." Id. (citing Ward, 448 U.S. at 249).
167. Hendricks, 117 S.Ct. at 2081. One notable exception to this standard was United States v. Halper, 490
U.S. 435 (1989), since repudiated by the Court. See Hudson, 118 S. Ct. at 493-94 ("Halper marked the first time
we applied the Double Jeopardy Clause to a sanction without first determining that it was criminal in nature.").
168. United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267 (1996).
169. United States v. Austin, 509 U.S. 602 (1993).
170. Hudson v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 488 (1997).
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constitutional provision should turn on the "reasons" it was included in the
Constitution and "the evils it was designed to eliminate." 
1 7 1
Hendricks, however, marks a distinct departure from this approach. The Hen-
dricks majority addressed the ex post facto claim before it in utter disregard for the
historic purposes and design of the Ex Post Facto Clause, failing to cite a single ex
post facto case in the face of two hundred years of case law interpreting the central
purpose and role of the Ex Post Facto Clause in the American constitutional
system. 172 Instead, the Hendricks Court relied on cases arising under the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments, 173 and inappropriately adopted the highly deferential two-
pronged "intent-effects" test employed by the Court in Ursery, a double jeopardy
case. 174
The Court's infidelity gives little reason to be comforted by its assurance that its
ex post facto jurisprudence is premised on " 'substance, not shadows.' ,175
171. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 442 (1965). The Second Circuit very recently described the test as
follows: "For the precise purpose of determining whether a retroactively imposed burden constitutes 'punish-
ment' within the meaning of the Ex Post Facto Clause, the Supreme Court has instructed that we should focus our
attention on the twin purposes to be served by this constitutional prohibition." Doe v. Pataki, 120 F.3d 1263, 1273
(2d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1066 (1998). See also Halper, 490 U.S. at 447 (distinguishing Double
Jeopardy Clause goals from other provisions); Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minn. Pub. Int. Res. Group, 468 U.S. 841,
856 (1984) (concluding that federal statute denying financial aid to male students who failed to register with the
draft did not "inflict punishment within the meaning of the Bill of Attainder Clause"); Nixon v. Administrator of
Gen'l Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 480 (1977) (stating central concern of Bill of Attainder Clause as being fear of
legislative "pander to an inflamed popular constituency" and therefore deeming lack of congressional punitive
sentiment significant in attainder challenge); Dufresne v. Baer, 744 F.2d 1543, 1546 (11 th Cir. 1984) ("When
subjecting a law to ex post facto scrutiny, courts should bear in mind the related aims of the ex post facto clause
.... .).
172. The Court's inexplicable omission is all the more remarkable when viewed in comparison to the Court's
contemporary opinions relating to the Bill of Attainder Clause, also contained in Article I, and in many respects
the "twin" of the Ex Post Facto Clause. These opinions consistently give prominent effect to the constitutional
purpose and role of the Bill of Attainder Clause. See, e.g., Minnesota Pub. Int. Res. Group, 468 U.S. at 841; Nixon,
433 U.S. at 468-75; Brown, 381 U.S. at 442-43; United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 314-18 (1946).
173. Aside from basing its decision on only selected factors enunciated by Mendoza-Martinez, a case focusing
on Fifth and Sixth Amendment procedural concerns, the majority relied upon Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364
(1986), which concerned the Fifth Amendment's guarantee against compulsory self-incrimination, and United
States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987), a Fifth Amendment substantive due process case.
Moreover, there is evidence of an even more fundamental confusion in the Court's analytic framework. In
Austin, 509 U.S. at 610 n.6, the Court made clear that Mendoza-Martinez is inapposite when the claim before the
Court turns on whether "punishment" is being imposed-as opposed to whether a "criminal proceeding" is at
issue (as in Mendoza-Martinez). Although Hendricks indisputably posed a "punishment question," Justice
Thomas mistakenly framed the question as being whether the SVPA established "criminal proceedings for
constitutional purposes." Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2082.
174. See Russell v. Gregiore, 124 F.3d 1079, 1086-87 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting that Hendricks employed
Ursery's two-pronged "intent-effects" test), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1191 (1998); Roe v. Office of Adult
Probation, 125 F.3d 47, 53 (2d Cir. 1997) (same).
175. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 31 n.15 (1981) (quoting Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277,
325 (1867)). This glaring lack of constitutional fidelity is unfortunate. As one commentator recently noted:
[T]o satisfy the requirements of judicial legitimacy in a democratic state, [the Court must adopt] an
approach rooted in the constitutional text and its underlying principles, rather than in untethered
judgments about the strengths and weaknesses of particular policies. The jurisprudence must also
AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW
Indeed, one would be hard-pressed to find circumstances more demanding of
"substance" than the facts of Hendricks. The narrow target group of the Kansas
SVPA, the highly repulsive nature of the persons it targets, and its retroactive
design, should have triggered an acute sensitivity to the core concerns and
purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clause. Such sensitivity, however, was plainly
absent from the majority's opinion.
The failure of the Hendricks majority (including Chief Justice Rehnquist, the
author of Ursery) to follow the Court's unequivocal command to interpret the
punishment question in constitutional context is especially ironic-and unjusti-
fied-in light of the fact that the Court had before it the Ex Post Facto Clause, a
provision of profound significance to the American constitutional framework. 1
76
2. Undue Deference to Legislative "Labels"
Furthermore, the Hendricks Court's analytic method in its "statutory construc-
tion" of the SVPA flies in the face of accepted case law on the punishment
question. As noted by the Court in Kurth Ranch,17 7 "the legislature's description
of a statute as civil does not foreclose the possibility that it has a punitive
character.' 78 Similarly, in Collins v. Youngblood,'79 the Court observed that
"simply by labeling a law [as regulatory], a legislature does not thereby immunize
it from scrutiny under the Ex Post Facto Clause." ' 80 The basis for this abiding
suspicion is obvious: governments have strong incentives to avoid labeling a given
sanction as "criminal." Aside from the appeal of avoiding application of the
manifold constitutional constraints associated with the imposition of "punish-
be flexible, recognizing that different constitutional provisions are based on different principles
and therefore impose distinct limitations on government action.
Ashutosh Bhugwat, Purpose Scrutiny in Constitutional Analysis, 85 CAL. L. REv. 297, 368 (1997). See also
Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Living Hand of the Past: History and Constitutional Justice, 65 FORDHAM L. REv.
1611, 1611-12 (1997) ("History should figure in constitutional interpretation as an aid to the pursuit of justice
.. .. .).
176. The Court's detour has not gone unnoticed by the lower courts. The Ninth Circuit, in its recent opinion
upholding Washington State's version of "Megan's Law" against an Ex Post Facto Clause challenge, observed:
We are mindful that Ursery was a Double Jeopardy Clause case, and that it warned against lifting a
test for punishment from one constitutional provision and applying it to another. In Hendrics,
however, the Court used the same test for the Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses, leading
us to conclude that the test for punishment is the same for both clauses.
Russell v. Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079, 1086 n.6 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1191 (1998). The Third
Circuit concluded likewise in rejecting an ex post facto challenge against New Jersey's "Megan's Law." See E.B.
v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077, 1092 (3d Cit. 1997) ("punishment" now has same meaning under the Double
Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1039 (1998).
177. 511 U.S. 767 (1994).
178. Id. at 777.
179. 497 U.S. 37 (1990).
180. Id. at 46. See Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall) 277, 325 (1867) ("[T]he Constitution deals with
substance, not shadows. The inhibition was labeled at the thing, not the name.").
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ment" (e.g., double jeopardy, ex post facto, and bill of attainder concerns),
significant institutional costs attend criminal sanctions. It takes time and money to
afford criminal defendants the array of substantive and procedural protections
demanded by the Constitution. 8 1 In addition, the availability of a putatively
"civil" sanction can be a welcome coercive weapon in the State's prosecutorial
arsenal.' 82 Taken together, these considerations amply justify the Court's historic
reluctance to uncritically accept legislative representations of nonpunitive intent.
Hendricks, however, is notably bereft of this incredulity. The Court inferred a
nonpunitive purpose on the part of the Kansas Legislature essentially because it
labeled the SVPA a "civil commitment procedure" and relegated the SVPA to the
innocuous confines of the Kansas probate code. 183 Having satisfied itself that
"nothing on the face of the statute suggest[ed] anything other than a civil
commitment scheme," the Court demanded that Hendricks present the "clearest
proof," either in "purpose or effect," to contradict this "manifest intent."
' 18 4
Hendricks, of course, failed to carry this "heavy burden," taking his case outside
the "limited circumstances" in which the Court would second-guess the Kansas
Legislature. 185
In short, the Hendricks majority exhibited a marked deference to Kansas's
purported intent, and in so doing plainly eschewed the Court's espoused abiding
suspicion over legislative "labels."
3. The "Clearest Proof" Standard
The "clearest proof" standard employed by the Hendricks Court itself warrants
serious reexamination. Although the Court cited its 1980 decision in United States
v. Ward186 as authority for the "clearest proof" standard, the standard's true
intellectual forebear is the 1960 decision in Flemming v. Nestor i 7 In Nestor, the
Court faced bill of attainder, ex post facto, and Sixth Amendment challenges to the
federal Social Security Act, the application of which retroactively terminated Mr.
Nestor's social security benefits because he was a resident alien deported for his
181. See Carol S. Steiker, Punishment and Procedure: Punishment Theory and the Criminal-Civil Procedural
Divide, 85 GEO. L.J. 775, 777-78 (1997) ("Deeply embedded in Anglo-American law.., is a sharp procedural
divide between criminal and civil cases. In criminal cases, the U.S. Constitution requires a long list of costly,
thumb-on-the-scale procedural protections that are not required, and thus rarely employed, in civil cases."). See
also Cheh, supra note 33, at 1326 (describing the advantages of the civil route in drug seizures and forfeitures
because the government can acquire the subject property without submitting to the expensive and arduous dictates
of the criminal process).
182. See generally Susan R. Klein, Civil In Rem Forfeiture and Double Jeopardy, 82 IowA L. REV. 183 (1996)
(stating that prosecutors increasingly are employing civil in rem forfeiture to gain tactical advantages over
criminal targets).
183. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2082.
184. Id.
185. See id. at 2075.
186. 448 U.S. 242 (1980).
187. 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
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prior membership in the Communist Party.'88 The 5-4 majority articulated the
following standard:
We observe initially that only the clearest proof could suffice to establish the
unconstitutionality of a statute [on the basis of legislative purpose] ... [T]he
presumption of constitutionality with which this enactment, like any other,
comes to us forbids us lightly to choose that reading of the statute's setting
which will invalidate it over that which will save it.
189
While the Nestor "clearest proof" standard has been invoked sporadically since
1960,90 the standard's evident reluctance to scrutinize legislative purpose is
antithetical to the punishment question,' 9 ' particularly with respect to ex post facto
analysis. As discussed, with the notable exception of Hendricks, the Court's ex
post facto opinions have been predicated on a avowed effort to discern legislative
purpose.'92 Indeed, in DeVeau v. Braisted,193 an ex post facto case handed down
just two weeks before Nestor, the Court reaffirmed that the fundamental question
in ex post facto analysis "is whether the legislative aim was to punish that
individual for past activity. . .. " ,
Whatever value the Nestor "clearesi proof" standard has as a general tenet of
188. Nestor immigrated to the United States from Bulgaria in 1913, and lived and worked in his adopted land
until 1956, when at the age of 69 he was deported for having been a Communist from 1933-1939. See id. at 605.
189. Id. at 617.
190. In addition to Hendricks, the Court has invoked the "clearest proof" standard in seven cases since Nestor:
Hudson v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 488 (1997); United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267 (1996); Hicks v. Feiock, 485
U.S. 624 (1988); Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364 (1986); United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S.
354 (1984); United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1980); and Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control
Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (1961).
191. Notwithstanding its purported disavowal of legislative history, the Nestor Court in fact resorted to the
legislative record in trying to assess the underlying purpose of the Social Security Act. However, because virtually
none existed, the effort was to no avail. See Nestor, 363 U.S. at 619. In this respect, the Nestor Court distinguished
the record before it from United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946) that where a bill of attainder violation was
found, because in that case the Court had relied "in large measure on the specific Congressional history which the
Court was at pains to spell out in detail." Nestor, 363 U.S. at 615. Still yet, the Court cited several of its cases were
premised on legislative history, noting instances in which the "Court's first-hand acquaintance with the events and
mood" was determinative in assessing whether a nominally civil penalty was actually punitive. Id.
In the end, it can also be argued that the Court's apparent belittlement of legislative purpose in Nestor amounted
to mere dictum, The principal claim before the Court, the bill of attainder challenge, did not succeed because the
Social Security Act did not "single [Nestor] out," thus failing the sine qua non of a bill of attainder violation. See
Lovett, 328 U.S. at 316 (stating that bills of attainder are "designed to apply to particular individuals"). The
Nestor majority continued:
[e]ven were that history to be taken as evidencing Congress' [punitive motivation], we do not think
this, standing alone, would suffice to establish a punitive purpose. This would still be a far cry from
the situations [of cases involving bills of attainder] ... where the legislation was on its face aimed
at particular individuals.
Nestor, 363 U.S. at 619.
192. See supra notes 107-24 and accompanying text.
193. 363 U.S. 144 (1960).
194. Id. at 160 (emphasis added).
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statutory construction, 195 in Hendricks the standard effectively imposed an irrebut-
table presumption in favor of finding a civil intent on the part of the Kansas
Legislature.' 96 Rather than demanding reduced judicial scrutiny of legislative
purpose-basic to the "clearest proof" standard-the Ex Post Facto Clause
demands assiduous, heightened scrutiny of legislative purpose. 97
4. Abdication of Constitutional Role
With its blind deference to the assurances of the Kansas Legislature, Hendricks
in the end also raises fundamental concerns over whether the Court has abdicated
its role as constitutional arbiter in our tripartite system.198 As recently observed by
195. Judge Becker of the Third Circuit recently questioned uncritical application of the Nestor standard for this
same reason, stating:
I warn against placing too much emphasis on the meaning of "clearest proof." As [Nestor] and its
progeny make patent, the standard is intended as a kind of warning to the federal courts to give
legislatures the benefit of the doubt. It is thus consistent with familiar canons of statutory
interpretation and constitutional adjudication stating that legislatures are rational bodies that
intend to function within their powers to enact lawful measures.
E.B. v. Vemiero, 119 F.3d 1077, 1128 (3d Cir. 1997) (Becker, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1039 (1998).
196. In Hudson, Justices Souter, Breyer, and Ginsburg, while agreeing that the penalty at issue did not qualify
as "punishment" under Ward and Mendoza-Martinez, faulted the Court's continued use of the "clearest proof"
standard. Justice Souter viewed the "clearest proof" standard merely as "a function of the strength of the
countervailing indication of the civil nature (including the presumption of constitutionality enjoyed by an
ostensibly civil statute making no provision for the safeguards guaranteed to criminal defendants)." Hudson, 118
S. Ct. at 500-01 (Souter, J., concurring in result) (citation omitted). He also doubted that resort to the standard
would be the "rare case," as previously assured by the Court, given the "expanding use of ostensibly civil
forfeitures and penalties ... a development doubtless spurred by the increasingly inviting prospect of its profit to
the Government." Id. Justices Breyer and Ginsburg, for their part, called the "clearest proof" standard
"misleading" and urged "consign[ing] it to the same legal limbo where Halper now rests." Id. (Breyer, J., with
Ginsburg, J., concurring in result).
197. See California Dep't of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 522 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(declaring that "the concerns that animate the Ex Post Facto Clause demand enhanced, and not ... reduced,
judicial scrutiny.").
The Third Circuit recently commented on the Hendricks Court's new approach:
[T]he Supreme Court had previously required this degree of deference only in cases where the
issue before it was "whether a proceeding is effectively criminal so that the procedural protections
of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments must apply" in that proceeding. After Hendricks, however, it
seems clear that similar deference to the legislative judgment is required whenever legislative
measures are challenged on the basis of the Ex Post Facto and Double Jeopardy Clauses.
E.B., 119 F.3d at 1096. On this basis, the E.B. court had no difficulty rejecting the petitioners' ex post facto
challenge to New Jersey's "Megan's Law." Id. at 1097 (stating that the Court must "give substantial deference"
to the "legislature's declared purpose").
198. A core mission of the judiciary, of course, is the countermajoritarian role it plays relative to the other
branches of government. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAsT DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT
THE BAR OF POLmcs 25 (2d ed. 1986) (stating that the "courts have certain capacities for dealing with matters of
principle that legislatures and executives do not possess."). Justice Douglas characterized the role as follows:
The judiciary is an indispensable part of the operation of our federal system. With the growing
complexities of government it is often the one and only place where effective relief can be obtained
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Professor Richard Fallon, "[i]dentifying the 'meaning' of the Constitution is not
the Court's only function. A crucial mission of the Court is to implement the
Constitution successfully."' 9 9 In Trop v. Dulles,2° Chief Justice Warren character-
ized the Court's oversight role as follows:
We are oath-bound to defend the Constitution ... [tihe Judiciary has the duty
of implementing the constitutional safeguards that protect individual rights.
When the Government acts to take away [a] fundamental right ... the
safeguards of the Constitution should be examined with special diligence ...
We cannot push back the limits of the Constitution merely to accommodate
challenged legislation.
20 1
Alexander Hamilton made this same point in Federalist Number 78, asserting that
the Court plays a crucial role as a constitutional buffer, giving effect to the
fundamental rights of the governed in the face of the at times arbitrary powers of
legislators:
[T]he courts were designed to be an intermediate body between the people and
the legislature, in order, among other things, to keep the latter within the limits
assigned by their authority .... Nor does this conclusion by any means
suppose a superiority of the judicial to the legislative power. It only supposes
that the power of the people is superior to both; and that where the will of the
legislature, declared in its statutes, stands in opposition to that of the people,
declared in the Constitution, the judges ought to be governed by the latter
rather than the former.
20 2
... [W]here wrongs to individuals are done by violation of specific guarantees, it is abdication for
courts to close their doors. Marshall wrote in Marbury v. Madison... that if the judiciary stayed its
hand in deference to the legislature, it would give the legislature "a practical and real onipo-
tence."
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, Il (1968) (Douglas, J., concurring). For an incisive, comprehensive treatment of the
at-times controversial history of the judiciary's countermajoritarian role see Barry Friedman, The History of the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One: The Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333 (1998).
199. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Foreward: Implementing the Constitution, Ill HARV. L. REv. 56, 57 (1997); see
also id. at 61 ("The indispensable function of constitutional doctrine.., is to implement the Constitution.").
200. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
201. Id. at 103-04 (1958). See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 152 (Phillips Bradley et al.
eds., 1946) (1840) (arguing that Justices "must be statesmen, wise to discern the signs of the times, not afraid to
brave the obstacles that can be subdued, nor slow to turn away from the current when it threatens to sweep them
off .... ).
202. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, 438-39 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kranmick ed., 1987); see also McConnell,
supra note 96, at 1278 n. 45:
The words of the Constitution are not authoritative for fetischistic reasons, but because they are the
verbal embodiment of certain collective decisions made by the people. The theory of judicial
review is not based on any claim that judges are superior to the people, but on the claim that in
enforcing the Constitution, they are carrying out the will of the people. It follows, then, that judges
act legitimately under the Constitution only when they are faithfully enforcing those collective
decisions.
As Professor Bickel observed, the unique institutional position of the judiciary, freed of the coercive forces that
beset the executive and legislative branches "lengthens everyone's view." BICKEL, supra note 198, at 26.
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As the Court itself recently observed, it "has the duty to review the constitutional-
ity of congressional enactments," notwithstanding Congress's insistence that an
enactment is constitutional.2 °3 This mandate can be traced back to Marbury itself,
in which Chief Justice Marshall intoned: "[t]he very essence of civil liberty ...
consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws,
whenever he receives an injury." 204
The extremely deferential approach of Hendricks, an opinion which relied on
not a single ex post facto case to support its holding, effectively read the Ex Post
Facto Clause out of the Constitution. That this eschewal should occur with respect
to the Ex Post Facto Clause, one of the select, enumerated "affirmative" limita-
tions on the legislative branch,205 and a constitutional provision as to which there
exists no dispute over either its "original" or modem understanding, 2 6 is
especially disenchanting. The time has long since passed when the Ex Post Facto
Clause proscription was conceived as a "political obligation that voters will
enforce politically.", 20 7 Rather, it is a constitutional imperative that the judiciary is
duty-bound to zealously uphold and implement.20 8 Still more ominous, with
Hendricks, the Court has sanctioned a "constitutional evil. ',209 By ignoring the
core purposes of the Clause, the Court has given the go-ahead to a broad array of
203. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 391 (1990).
204. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803). Professor J.M. Balkin recently articulated the
command even more forcefully: "Fidelity is not a virtue but a precondition. It's not just a good thing, but the point
of the practice of constitutional interpretation. To claim to interpret the Constitution is already to claim to be
faithful to it." J.M. Balkin, Agreements With Hell and Other Objects of Our Faith, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 1703,
1705 (1997).
205. See John Harrison, The Constitutional Origins and Implications of Judicial Review, 84 VA. L. REv. 333,
341 (1998) ("Affirmative limitations qualify the authority otherwise granted to the legislature, with the result that
even properly enacted ex post facto laws are invalid and legally ineffective, to be treated by the courts as legal
nullities.").
206. See McConnell, supra note 96, at 1280 n.53.(1997) (stating that the "drafting history" of the Ex Post
Facto Clause "is especially clear" and its interpretation "is therefore uncomplicated by disagreements over
historical evidence .... "). Cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (resorting to the view that
"specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations .... ").
207. Harrison, supra note 205, at 338 (analyzing differing views of Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury and
Pennsylvanian Supreme Court Justice John Gibson, the latter deeming the Clause a mere political control on
legislatures).
208. See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 178.
209. Balkin, supra note 204, at 1706 n.6 (noting that the "Constitution can be responsible for injustices
because it permits them (e.g., slavery and police abuse) or because it prohibits government from engaging in
reforms necessary to ameliorate them (e.g., the use of the Tenth Amendment to prohibit child labor laws)."). As
representative of such an instance, one can point to the Court's opinion in Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957
(1991) which, against an Eighth Amendment proportionality challenge, upheld a mandatory life-without-parole
sentence based on petitioner's conviction, his first, for possessing 650 grams of cocaine. In the wake of Harmelin,
state and federal courts have shown a marked reluctance to entertain proportionality claims. See, e.g., Henderson
v. State, 910 S.W.2d 656,660 (Ark. 1995) (citing Harmelin and upholding sentence of life imprisonment for
first-time offender convicted of selling three "rocks" of crack cocaine). See generally Wayne A. Logan,
Proportionality and Punishment: Imposing Life without Parole on Juveniles, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 101 (1998)
(discussing dramatic effect of Harmelin on proportionality review).
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possible future injustices in the years to come.2 10
5. "Punishment" Versus "Enhancement"
Finally, Hendricks is all the more perplexing given the relative cohesion of the
Court's recent opinions on the related question of whether a particular legislative
enactment constitutes an impermissible "punishment enhancement" under the Ex
Post Facto Clause.2"1 The "enhancement question" arises, in the words of the
Ninth Circuit, with "changes in the law that decrease the chances that a prisoner
will be released from prison early or will receive a shorter prison term."' 212 These
cases turn "on whether the change increase[s] the quantum of punishment
attached to an already-committed crime. The Court... ha[s] no need to determine
the threshold question of whether the sanction was punishment since a criminal
sentence of imprisonment is plainly punishment.",21 3 Rather than being asked
whether the SVPA subjected Leroy Hendricks to an "increase" in punishment, the
Hendricks Court was faced with the question of whether his involuntary civil
commitment was "punishment."
.Significantly, only four months before Hendricks was decided, the Court handed
down Lynce v. Mathis, 2 14 which involved a Florida statute that canceled provi-
sional early release credits awarded to alleviate prison overcrowding. Proclaiming
that the Constitution "places limits on the sovereign's ability to use its law-making
power to modify bargains it has made with its subjects, ' 21 5 the Lynce Court
unanimously struck down the Florida law on ex post facto grounds.216
Although the Court has never expressly stated that two distinct bodies of
210. In this sense, the extreme facts of Hendricks, involving involuntary detention without promise of
treatment in the wake of a criminal conviction, can and doubtless will be used to justify lesser intrusions on
personal liberties because they are "non-penal." Indeed, with Hendricks decided, challenges to the notification
provisions of the various incarnations of "Megan's Laws," which do not entail physical detention, have been
readily rebuffed. See, e.g., E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1039 (1998);
Roe v. Farwell, 999 F. Supp. 174 (D. Mass. 1998).
211. See Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 42 (1990) (finding Clause guards against any law which: (1)
punishes an act which was innocent when committed; (2) retroactively increases punishment for a crime; and (3)
retroactively deprives one of a defense available at the time an offense was committed).
212. Russell v. Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079, 1085 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 1191 (1998). The Court
added that "[piroperly viewed, ["enhancement question" cases] are not punishment-defining cases at all." Id. See
also Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 668 N.E.2d 738, 751 (Mass. 1996) (distinguishing "penal" versus
"concededly penal" orientation). But see Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 824-27 (9th Cir. 1997) (construing and
applying, in a decidedly "enhancement" context, Hendricks in ex post facto challenge to prison program that
classified sex offenders and required participation in sex offender treatment as a precondition of parole eligibility).
213. Russell, 124 F.3d at 1085.
214. 117 S. Ct. 891 (1997).
215. Id. at 895. Plainly, the Court's point here applies with equal force to Leroy Hendricks. When Hendricks
pled guilty in 1984 he had no idea of the possible application to him of the SVPA, enacted ten years hence, and
which would likely subject him to indefinite "civil confinement."
216. See id. The Court's approach can perhaps best be described as "effects-based," focusing on "objective
considerations" relative to how an inmate's sentence is affected. See also id. at 897 (reaffirming "effects-
oriented" approach taken in California Dept of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499 (1995)).
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jurisprudence exist, their distinctiveness is nonetheless evident.2 1 7 In stark contrast
to the hodgepodge jurisprudence of Hendricks, Lynce represents a remarkably
consensus-based effort by the Court to forge a principled framework to answer the
enhancement question.2 1 The jurisprudential chaos of the sharply divided Hen-
dricks Court, when compared with Lynce, is all the more striking because the
punishment question and the enhancement question emanate from the same
constitutional concern .2 1 9
Whatever the merits of the Court's case law on the enhancement question, the
evident disparity between Hendricks and Lynce further highlights the need to
formulate a reliable, constitutionally based approach to resolving the punishment
question in the ex post facto context. The next part tries to do just that.
V. A PROPOSED APPROACH
Any effort to create a framework for addressing the punishment question in the
ex post facto context must give effect to the dominant purpose of the Clause: to
217. Indeed, it is noteworthy that Lynce does not even mention any of its "punishment-defining" cases, instead
relying exclusively on its prior cases in the "punishment-enhancement" area. See, e.g., California Dep't of
Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499 (1995); Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37 (1990); Miller v. Florida, 482
U.S. 423 (1987); Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24 (1981). This jurisprudential chasteness, on its face, is readily
distinguishable from Hendricks, which failed to cite a single ex post facto case, and principally relied instead on
Fifth and Sixth Amendment precedents.
One can only speculate on the etiology of this apparent difference in approaches. Quite possibly, the relative
consistency of the enhancement question ("concededly penal") line of cases derives from the fact that
enhancement lends itself to a more quantitative analysis. See Morales, 514 U.S. at 509 ("[W]e have long held that
the question of what legislative adjustments 'will be held to be of sufficient moment to transgress the
constitutional prohibition' must be a matter of degree.") (emphasis added) (citation omitted). The punishment
question, on the other hand, usually turns on questions of penological theory, and is complicated by the fact that
sanctions often at once serve both punitive and remedial purposes. See DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND
MODERN SOCIETY: A STUDY IN SOCIAL THEORY 16-17 (1990) (" '[P]unishment' is in fact a complex set of
interlinked processes and institutions rather than a uniform object or events .... It is not susceptible to a logical or
formulaic definition...."); NICOLA LACEY, STATE PUNISHMENT: POLITICAL PRINCIPLES AND COMMUNITY VALUES
4-15 (1988) (discussing difficulties with defining "punishment").
All this notwithstanding, one is tempted to ask, at least from the perspective of Leroy Hendricks, whether his
case actually was perhaps about "enhancing" his punishment after all, given that he never technically left the
custody of the State.
218. See Lynce, 117 S. Ct. at 896-97 (describing evolution of the jurisprudence); Morales, 514 U.S. at 516
(Stevens, J., dissenting) ("In light of the importance that the Framers placed on the Ex Post Facto Clause, we have
always enforced the prohibition against the retroactive enhancement scrupulously.").
Morales itself was a 7-2 decision, with Justice Thomas writing for the majority, concluding that amending
parole procedures to decrease frequency of parole suitability hearings was not violative of the Clause. Morales,
514 U.S. at 516. See also Miller, 482 U.S. at 423 (unanimously holding that retroactive revision in sentencing
guideline was violative); Weaver, 450 U.S. at 24 (concluding without dissent that retroactive decrease in
"gain-time" for good behavior was violative); Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. 397 (1937)(unanimously finding
violation when offender was sentenced under law that required 15 year sentence, when law in effect at time of
offense gave court discretion to impose lesser sentence).
219. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 397 (1798) (opinion of Paterson, J.)(examining historical sources
and concluding that "[tihe enhancement of a crime, or penalty, seems to come within the same mischief as the
creation of a crime or penalty"). See also Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 668 N.E.2d 738, 751 (Mass. 1996)
(acknowledging that it is not "easy to determine" which category is at play).
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guard against legislative vindictiveness and abuse. Hendricks, however, mani-
festly failed to do this, and instead adopted an approach at radical odds with the
purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clause.220
A. The Case for Heightened Scrutiny of Legislative Purpose
Under Ex Post Facto Analysis
As discussed, the Hendricks Court's highly deferential, facial method of
construction, coupled with its insistence that there exist the "clearest proof" to
contradict this "manifest intent," created an impossibly high proof threshold, and
in the precise context where the opposite approach should have obtained. Logic
and constitutional principle compel that the Court should adopt a juristic approach
of exacting scrutiny on questions of legislative purpose when addressing the
punishment question relative to ex post facto claims.2 2 '
The Court's seminal ex post facto cases-including Cummings v. Missouri
222
and Ex parte Garland223-make clear that an ex post facto challenge, by
definition, requires demanding scrutiny of legislative purpose. Above all, the
Court's mission in ex post facto analysis is to determine whether there was a
"legislative aim to punish"; to answer this question, the enactment must "be
placed in the context of the structure and history of the legislation of which it is a
part.
' 224
"Purpose scrutiny," especially over the past two decades, has played an
increasingly significant role in constitutional analysis, 5 especially in areas of
constitutional interpretation closely aligned with the animating concerns of the Ex
Post Facto Clause. For instance, in the equal protection context, legislative intent
220. Professor Lawrence Tribe has also noted the Court's recurrent insensitivity to the purposes and goals of
the Clause. He notes in his treatise that the Court "'has not been systematically attentive to the purposes of the ex
post facto ban .... LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITIOrONAL LAW 637 (2d ed. 1988).
221. Because retribution and revenge play a central role in the impulse to punish, logic would dictate that the
effort to discern this purpose should be peculiarly sensitive to identifying any such vengeful sentiments. See
JAMES F STEPHEN, A GENERAL Vmw OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 99 (MacMillan, 1863) ("[T]he criminal
law stands to the passion of revenge in much the same relation as marriage to the sexual appetite."). See also JOEL
FEINBERG, THE EXPRESSIVE FUNCTION OF PUNIsHMENT, reprinted in THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 636 (4th ed. 1991)
("Punishment is a conventional device for the expression of attitudes of disapproval and reprobation, either on the
part of the punishing authority or of those in whose name the punishment is imposed."); H.L.A. HART,
PROLEGOMENON TO THE PRINCIPLES OF PUNISHMENT, reprinted in H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY
4-5 (1968) (setting forth five-part definition of "punishment," the fourth requirement prescribing that "[i]t must
be intentionally administered by human beings ... .
222. 71 U.S. (4 Wall) 277 (1867).
223. 71 U.S. (4 Wall) 333 (1867).
224. DeVeau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 147 (1960).
225. See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in Constitutional Analysis, 85 CAL. L. REv. 297, 301 (1997)
(identifying "trend within the Court's jurisprudence toward an increased focus" on governmental purpose);
Fallon, supra note 199, at 90-97 (noting same and also discussing Court's use of "surrogate" measures to discern
purpose).
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plays a critical role relative to whether a particular classification is discriminatory. 226 In
Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board,227 a voting rights case handed down in the
same term as Hendricks, the Court assessed Louisiana's proposed redistricting
plan and emphasized that "assessing ajurisdiction's motivation in enacting voting
changes is a complex task requiring a 'sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial
and direct evidence as may be available.' ,,228 Harkening back to its decision in
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. ,229 the Court asked
whether "invidious discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor ... " and
considered, in addition to the possible discriminatory "impact" of the redistricting
plan, a non-exclusive list of other factors, including: " 'the historical background
of the Uurisdiction's] decision'; '[t]he specific sequence of events leading up to the
challenged decision'; '[dlepartures from the normal procedural sequence'; and
'[t]he legislative or administrative history, especially ... [any] contemporary
statements by members of the decisionmaking body.' ,230
Legislative context also played a crucial role in the Court's 1985 case Hunter v.
Underwood.23' In Hunter, the Court addressed whether a provision of the 1901
Alabama Constitution disenfranchised black voters in violation of the U.S.
Constitution, and looked squarely at the historical record to answer whether the
Alabama Legislature harbored a discriminatory purpose. Chief Justice Rehnquist
stated: "The historical record showed that the Alabama Constitutional Convention
of 1901 was part of a movement that swept the post-Reconstruction South to
disenfranchise blacks. The delegates to the all-white convention were not secretive
about their purpose., 232 Noting the unequivocally racist floor statements of the
president of the convention, the Court had no difficulty finding the provision
unconstitutional.233
226. See Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 491 (1989) ("[T]he Framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment... desired to place clear limits on the States' use of race as a criterion for legislative action, and to
have the federal courts enforce those limitations.").
227. 520 U.S. 471 (1997).
228. Id. at 1502 (quoting Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977)).
229. 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977). Arlington Heights built upon the Court's prior holding in Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229 (1976), where the Court rejected the less demanding disproportionate impact test in favor of an
approach that sought to discern whether a discriminatory purpose motivated the legislative enactment at issue.
230. Bossier Parish School Bd., 117 S. Ct. at 1503 (citing Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 268). In
Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) the Court stated that proof of "discriminatory purpose" implies
"more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences.... It implies that the decisionmaker ...
selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse
effects upon an identifiable group." Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279.
231. 471 U.S. 223 (1985).
232. Id. at 229.
233. See id. at 233. See also Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982):
To reject an examination into subjective intent is not to rule that the reasons for legislative action
are irrelevant .... (C]ustomary indicia of legislative intent provide an adequate basis for ascertain-
ing the purpose that a law is intended to achieve. The formal proceedings of the legislature and its
committees, the effect of the measure as evidenced by its text, the historical setting in which it was
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The Court's analytic approach to discerning legislative purpose in the equal
protection context 234 shares much the same core concern that animates (or should
animate) ex post facto analysis: both seek to discern and root out the legislative
results of inherently internal mental processes, the motivations of which are rarely
evident on the face of laws themselves. For obvious reasons, any modem-day
legislator would be loath to directly express racial animus, 35 and, as discussed
above,236 legislators have strong incentive to cloak or obfuscate punitive purpose.
The two areas of constitutional interpretation have other parallels as well. For
one, the racial and ethnic minorities protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, like
the "outgroups" most likely to raise colorable ex post facto claims (e.g., political
radicals and hardcore criminals), both historically have faced animus within
society, and thus have been subject to animus-driven legislative enactments.237 As
noted by Justice Stevens: "[t]here is obviously little legislative hay to be made
cultivating the multiple murderer vote.", 23 8 More generally, as Professor Donald
Dripps recently noted, the criminal sanction historically has been used both to
"disabl[e] political opposition" and as a means to express "malice toward
enacted, and the public acts and deeds of its sponsors and opponents, provide appropriate evidence
of legislative purpose.
458 U.S. at 644 n.28 (1982) (citation omitted) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
234. The Court's adoption of this approach is of relatively recent vintage. As recently as Palmer v. Thompson,
403 U.S. 217 (1971), the Court expressly refused to examine the motivations of the local legislative body in the
face of what clearly appeared to be racially motivated discriminatory behavior (concerning the decision by the
City Council of Jackson, Mississippi to close the town's public swimming pools rather than desegregate them).
Some five years later, however, in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1977), and especially inArlington Heights,
429 U.S. at 252, the Court effectively renounced its prior deference to legislative pronouncements of equal
treatment and adopted a totality of the circumstances approach-seeking objective indications of subjective illicit
intent and placing prime importance on legislative motivation. See also Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996); Shaw
v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995); Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222
(1985); Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982). See generally Fallon, supra note 199, at 91, 94-96 (discussing
same).
The highly critical mode of analysis is in sharp contrast to the deferential approach evident in equal protection
claims sounding in mere economic regulation. See, e.g., Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 235 (1981); United
States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980); City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303
(1976) ("[T]he classification challenged [must] be rationally related to a legitimate state interest .... ).
235. See BICKEL, supra note 198, at 62 ("Very occasionally, the racist motive may be provable. For the most
part, it can only be surmised."). Arguably, however, the psychology entailed in the respective impulses differ,
insofar as racial animus can have a significant subconscious component. See Charles R. Lawrence Ill, The Id, The
Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning With Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317 (1989).
236. See supra notes 143-144 and accompanying text.
237. Plainly, those coming within the punishment cross-hairs of legislatures can also, in demographic terms,
fall within traditional "footnote four" Carolene Products categorization. See United States v. Carolene Prods.
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938) (referring to "prejudice against discreet and insular minorities" that impairs
avenues of political redress, "and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry ... ").
238. California Dep't of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 522 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also
Krent, supra note 98, at 2168-69 ("Legislators need not fear that enacting most criminal measures will dry up
campaign coffers. Throughout history, criminal offenders have been from the poorest strata in society .... Nor
will legislators necessarily lose votes if they are insensitive to the needs of convicted felons. Felons often cannot
vote ... ").
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members of identifiable groups ....239
Another closely aligned area where the Court has intensely scrutinized legisla-
tive purpose is the Bill of Attainder Clause, which with its identical concerns for
vindictiveness and retroactive punishment, is in many ways the constitutional
"twin" of the Ex Post Facto Clause. 240 The Court's modem bill of attainder
decisions in United States v. Lovett,24 1 Nixon v. Administrator of General Ser-
vices,2 42 and Selective Service System v. Minnesota Public Interest Research
Group,243 reveal a remarkably consistent body of jurisprudence on the punishment
question, each highlighted by a predominant concern for legislative purpose. Chief
Justice Burger stated the test as follows:
In deciding whether a statute inflicts forbidden punishment, we have recog-
nized three necessary inquiries: (1) whether the challenged statute falls within
the historical meaning of legislative punishment; (2) whether the statute,
"viewed in terms of the type and severity of burdens imposed, reasonably can
be said to further nonpunitive purposes"; and (3) whether the legislative record
"evinces" a congressional intent to punish.2 4"
The Court's application of the test in Minnesota Public Interest is itself
instructive. There the Court considered whether retroactive application of the
federal Military Selective Service Act (MSSA), which denied financial aid to male
students that evaded the Vietnam War draft, amounted to an impermissible bill of
attainder. After first reviewing the purposes of the Bill of Attainder Clause and the
results reached in several of its landmark bill of attainder and ex post facto cases,
the Court determined that the sanction "impose[d] none of the burdens historically
239. Donald Dripps, The Exclusivity of the Criminal Law: Toward a "Regulatory Model "of or "Pathological
Perspective" on, the Civil-Criminal Distinction, 7 J. CONTE.MP. LEGAL ISSUES 199, 204-05 (1996). Professor
Dripps elaborates:
From the standpoint of a bad governor, it is far better to execute one's opponents for crimes than
for mere opposition.... The bad governor wants not just to remove opposition but to curry favor
among the politically relevant.... Given a high demand that members of some unpopular group
will suffer, prevailing authority will be eager to find members of that group who may be
characterized as criminals.
Id. at 204.
240. "The linking of bills of attainder and ex post facto laws is explained by the fact that a legislative
denunciation and condemnation of an individual often acted to impose retroactive punishment." Nixon v. Adm'r
of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425,469 n.30 (1977) (citation omitted). See also Morales, 514 U.S. at 521 n.4 (Stevens,
J., dissenting) ("The prohibitions on ex post facto laws and on bills of attainder are obviously closely related.");
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 513-14 (1989) ("The constitutional prohibitions against the
enactment of ex post facto laws and bills of attainder reflect a valid concern about the use of the political process
to punish or characterize past conduct of private citizens."). This close constitutional linkage is evident in the
numerous cases invoking both claims. See, e.g., Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867); Exparte
Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1867).
241. 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
242. 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
243. 468 U.S. 841 (1984).
244. Id. at 852 (citations omitted).
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associated with punishment" ;245 the sanction amounted to the " 'mere denial of a
noncontractual governmental benefit. No affirmative disability or restraint is
imposed.' ,246
The Court next addressed whether the "challenged statute can reasonably be
said to further nonpunitive goals,"-2 4 7 and focused exclusively, and at length, on
the legislative record of the MSSA. 248 The Court found "convincing support" for
the view that "Congress sought, not to punish anyone," but rather to promote
compliance with draft registration and fairness in allocation of scarce federal
resources, both legitimate regulatory ends.2 49 The Court also scrutinized the
statements of legislators in the committee reports and floor debates leading up to
the passage of the MSSA, and on this basis ultimately found a lack of punitive
250intent.
By adopting what amounts to a "totality-of-the-circumstances" test in the bill of
attainder and equal protection contexts the Court has made clear that scrutiny of
legislative history and context must play a central role in legislative construction in
these constitutional contexts. In so doing, it has embraced and put into effect Chief
Justice Marshall's belief that "[w]here the mind labours to discover the design of
the legislature, it seizes everything from which aid can be derived." 25' Or, perhaps
more cynically, as Justice Cardozo offered: "Weasel words will not avail to defeat
the triumph of intention when once the words are read in the setting of the whole
transaction."
252
As the foregoing discussion should make clear, the same concerns that drive the
Court's scrutiny of legislative purpose in the equal protection and bill of attainder
contexts should drive evaluation of the punishment question for ex post facto purposes.
The challenge remains, however, to achieve a workable method of achieving this goal.
245. Id.
246. Id. (citing Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960)). The Court made clear that although the first
prong is denominated a "historical" inquiry, it is not a static one, but rather changes over time. Id. (stating that the
"list of punishments forbidden ... has expanded to include legislative bars to participation by individuals or
groups in specific employments or professions."). This flexibility, Chief Justice Burger implied, springs from
prongs (2) and (3) of the test, which assess whether the legislature had a "nonpunitive goal" in endorsing the
enactment in question. Id. at 853-54.
247. Id. at 850.
248. See id.
249. See id. at 855-56.
250. See id. at 856 n.15. The Court's resort to the legislative record in both the second and third prongs of the
Nixon test arguably marked a departure from Nixon, which strictly conceived of the second prong as a "functional
test ... analyzing whether the law.. . viewed in terms of the type and severity of burdens imposed, reasonably
can be said to further nonpunitive legislative purposes." Nixon, 433 U.S. at 475.
251. United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 386 (1805). See also DiSanto v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S.
34, 43 (1927) ("The logic of words should yield to the logic of realities.").
252. Holyoke Water Power Co. v. American Writing Paper Co., 300 U.S. 324, 336 (1937). It bears mention that
one week before the issuance of Hendricks itself, Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, with Justice Stevens
writing for the three, advocated just such a "totality of the circumstances" approach to a challenge against a
Montana law that banned "physician assistants" from performing abortions. See Mazurek v. Armstrong, 117 S.
Ct. 1865, 1870 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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B. A New Test Articulated
In Kansas v. Hendricks, 253 the Court applied the two-pronged "intent-effects"
test which it first articulated in its other double jeopardy opinion in United States v.
254One Assortment of 89 Firearms,  and later employed in United States v.
Ursery.255 Very recently, in Russell v. Gregoire,25 6 the Ninth Circuit interpreted
Hendricks as follows:
The first part of the test ("intent") looks solely to the declared purpose of the
legislature as well as the structure and design of the statute... The second part
of the test ("effects") requires the party challenging the statute to provide "the
clearest proof" that the statutory scheme is so punitive either in purpose or
effect as to negate the State's nonpunitive intent.257
Faced with an ex post facto challenge to Washington's "Megan's Law," the
Ninth Circuit discerned a nonpunitive intent under the first prong on the basis of
the law's preamble, an inference buttressed by the law's overall regulatory
structure and design. Citing Hendricks, the Ninth Circuit in Russell rejected an
invitation to take into account the volatile legislative context in which the
provision originated. According to the court, "[h]owever quickly a law was
passed, and however heated the public sentiment around it, we look to the
legislature's manifest intent-which is found in the text and structure of the
law.", 258 The court then examined the "effects" of the law, and applying the
Mendoza-Martinez factors, found lacking, not surprisingly, the "clearest proof"
259
needed to overcome the announced nonpunitive legislative intent.
As Russell makes apparent, the "intent-effects" test plainly has ease of use to
recommend it. This ease, however, underscores the fundamental inadequacy of the
test, especially in the ex post facto context. By uncritically accepting the legisla-
ture's representations of nonpunitive intent, the Russell court (and the Hendricks
majority) really only applied the "effects" prong of the test, itself nothing more
than an application of the much-maligned Mendoza-Martinez factors, and a highly
selective, result-driven application at that.
260
This criticism, however, is not to say that "effects" should play no role, or even
a diminished role, in ex post facto punishment jurisprudence. At some point, as the
Supreme Court has noted, even an avowedly nonpunitive sanction can be "so
253. 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997).
254. 465 U.S. 354 (1984).
255. 518 U.S. 267 (1996).
256. 124 E3d 1079 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1191 (1998).
257. Id. at 1087-88.
258. Id.
259. See Russell, 124 F.3d at 1088.
260. The Hendricks Court's essentially "effects"-driven test, ironically, bears a striking resemblance to the
inquiry conducted in the "enhancement question" (Lynce) line of cases, which, as discussed in Part V of this
Article, expressly disavows any focus on legislative purpose.
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punitive in either purpose or effect" that punishment has been imposed.26 What is
required is an approach to ascertaining legislative purpose that is at once far more
comprehensive in scope and critical in method.
The challenge, therefore, lies in synthesizing the mix of motivational, theoreti-
cal, and practical concerns that constitute "punishment., 2 62 Although imperfect,
the approach adopted by the Third Circuit in its 1996 opinion in Artway v. Attorney
General of New Jersey263 is the best judicial effort yet formulated to arrive at a
workable test.
In addressing an ex post facto challenge to New Jersey's "Megan's Law," the
Artway court formulated a three-pronged test that scrutinizes legislation in terms
of: "(1) actual purpose, (2) objective purpose, and (3) effect.",264 Under this
formulation, if the actual, subjective intent of the legislature was to punish,
conclusive proof of an ex post facto violation is present. If, on the other hand,
hardship is merely an "incident to a regulation," then nonpunitive purpose can be
inferred.265 To ascertain this subjective purpose, one looks to legislative findings
contained in the enactment, as well as the statute's "circumstances" and legislative
history.2
66
The second part of the Artway test, the "objective" prong, has three subparts,
with a negative answer to any of the three compelling a conclusion that the
sanction is punitive:
First, can the law be explained solely by a remedial purpose?... Second, even
if some remedial purpose can fully explain the measure, does a historical
analysis show that the measure has traditionally been regarded as punishment?
If so, and if the text or legislative history does not demonstrate that this
measure is not punitive, it must be considered "punishment." Third, if the
legislature did not intend a law to be retributive but did intend it to serve some
261. See United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 362-63 (1984).
262. Professor Carol Steiker very recently provided a helpful effort to synthesize the work of several moral and
legal philosophers to provide a definition of punishment, so that we can "know it when we see it" and better
assess the role of procedure in that assessment. See Steiker, supra note 181, at 775.
263. 81 F.3d 1235 (3d Cir. 1996). The Third Circuit reaffirmed its commitment to the three-factorArtway test,
dismissing arguments that the Supreme Court's holdings in Ursery and Hendricks, both handed down after
Artway, invalidated Artway. See E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077, 1094-95 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct.
1039 (1998). In so doing, however, the Court was constrained to admit that Hendricks's introduction of the
"clearest proof" standard formerly limited to use in the contexts of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, amounted to
a significant procedural change:
After Hendricks ... it seems clear that similar deference to the legislative judgment is required
whenever legislative measures are challenged on the basis of the [Ex Post Facto Clause] ....
Accordingly, in Artway terms, if we determine that the actual legislative purpose was remedial, we
must sustain [the law] against the current challenges unless its objective purpose or its effect are
sufficiently punitive to overcome a presumption favoring the legislative judgment.
Id. at 1096.
264. Id. at 1263.
265. See id.
266. See id. at 1264.
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mixture of deterrent and salutary purposes, we must determine (1) whether
historically the deterrent purpose of such a law is a necessary complement to
its salutary operation and (2) whether the measure under consideration oper-
ates in its "usual" manner, consistent with its historically mixed purposes.267
Finally, if neither the subjective nor objective tests evinces a punitive purpose,
one must ask whether the "effects" of the sanction compel the conclusion that
punishment has been imposed. "If the negative repercussions-regardless of how
they are justified-are great enough, the measure must be considered punish-
ment."
268
Artway has appeal for two reasons. First, the test correctly insists upon a
meaningful and predominant focus on legislative purpose. By assessing both
subjective and objective indicia of purpose, the Artway test maximizes the
likelihood of an accurate evaluation. Second, its more lenient proof regime is
consistent with ex post facto analysis, in stark contrast to the "heavy burden" and
"clearest proof" requirements of Hendricks.
However, a central challenge remains: How to discern legislative purpose? This
challenge is discussed next.
C. Discerning Purpose From "Falderal": The Challenge
of Discerning Punitive Purpose
Since at least the 1880s, the Supreme Court has looked to legislative history to
inform its understanding of legislative purpose. 26 9 As discussed above, the Court's
seminal ex post facto decisions, as well as its equal protection and bill of attainder
decisions, are dominated by a desire to divine purpose on the basis of the
legislative record. Very recently, however, the Court's use of legislative history has
come under fire from "New Textualist" critics, the most prominent among them
being Associate Justice Antonin Scalia and Judge Frank Easterbrook of the
Seventh Circuit.2 7 0 From their perspective, the use of legislative history to infer
intent-or "Intentionalism" -has two fundamental flaws. 271 First, legislative
267. Id. at 1263.
268. Id.
269. See Hans W. Baade, Original Intent in Historical Perspective: Some Critical Glosses, 69 TEx. L. REV.
1001, 1082-84 (1991); HENRY BLACK, HANDBOOK ON THE CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF LAWS 224
(1896). See also County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 182 (1981) (Rehnquist, J. dissenting) ("[l]t is
well settled that the legislative history of a statute is a useful guide to the intent of Congress.").
270. See Livingston Rebuild Ctr., Inc. v. Railroad Ret. Bd., 970 F.2d 295, 298 (7th Cir. 1992) (Easterbrook, J.)
("Congress does not enact 'intents,' and certainly not the intents of witnesses; it enacts texts, which may differ
from the expectations of sponsors."); Bradley C. Karkkainen, "Plain Meaning ": Justice Scalia's Jurisprudence
of Strict Statutory Construction, 17 HARV. J.L. & Pub. POL'Y 401 (1994) (describing Justice Scalia's textualism).
271. One commentator defined the respective approaches as follows:
Intentionalism refers to the use of a variety of tools, including legislative purpose and legislative
history, in an effort to determine the intent of the legislature when it included a particular word or
phrase in a statute. Textualism refers to the use of a different set of tools, including dictionary
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history is unreliable due to its relative indeterminacy: the unwieldy legislative
process, representing a cacophony of views pointing in different directions, cannot
yield a single message. In the words of Judge Easterbrook, "intent is elusive for a
natural person, fictive for a collective body.",2 72 In Justice Scalia's words, "the
quest for the 'genuine' legislative intent is probably a wild-goose chase." 273 Judge
Easterbrook has stated, "To lend authoritative effect to unenacted legislative
history is to treat the carefully crafted legislative process as 'mere falderal.' ,,274
The New Textualist camp further posits that, even if a singular intent could be
identified, it should be rejected for any of a number of reasons, including: the risk
that the record has been "manufactured" to support judicial inferences that
otherwise might not garner the support of a legislative majority;27 5 the improbabil-
ity that legislators familiarize themselves with the legislative record, precluding
the likelihood that a vote in favor of a bill is tantamount to an endorsement of the
record;276 and the verity that legislators are motivated by multiple reasons, many
of them irrelevant, that extend far beyond salient ones of public policy when they
vote on legislation.277
The New Textualists' second concern is constitutional: that use of legislative
history is contrary to the bicameralism, presentment, and veto provisions of Article
I, insofar as legislative history is elevated to the status of law without having
satisfied the express procedural requirements of the legislative process.278
The impact of the New Textualists' attack has been indisputable, igniting sharp
definitions, rules of grammar, and canons of construction, in an effort to derive the putatatively
objective meaning of the statutory word or phrase.
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court's New Hype rtextualism: An Invitation to Cacophony and Incoherence in
the Administrative State, 95 COL. L. REV. 749, 750 (1995).
272. Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 61, 68 (1994).
273. Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DuKE L.J. 511, 517. A
similar sentiment was earlier expressed by Alexander Bickel: "Legislative motives are nearly always mixed and
nearly never professed. They are never both unmixed and authoritatively professed on behalf of an entire
legislative majority." ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 214 (1962).
274. Frank H. Easterbrook, Legal Interpretation and the Power of the Judiciary, 7 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 87,
92 (1984). See also Easterbrook, supra note 272, at 68-69 ("No matter how well we can know the wishes and
desires of legislators, the only way the legislature issues binding commands is to embed them in a law.").
275. See Kenneth W. Starr, Observations About the Use of Legislative History, 1987 DuKE L.J. 371, 377 ("It is
well known that technocrats, lobbyists and attorneys have created a virtual cottage industry in fashioning
legislative history so that the Congress will appear to embrace their particular point of view in a given statute.").
276. See Hirschey v. FERC, 777 F.2d 1, 7-8 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Scalia, J., concurring) (finding legislative record
suspect).
277. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 637 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (characterizing the
discernment of subjective motivations of legislators as impossible).
278. See Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 621 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[W]e
should try to give the text its fair meaning, whatever various committees might have had to say-thereby
affirming the proposition that we are a Government of laws not of committee reports."); Thompson v. Thompson,
484 U.S. 174, 192 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that legislative history is a "frail substitute ... for
bicameral vote upon the text of a law and its presentment to the President. "). But see William N. Eskridge, Jr., The
New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621,671-75 (1990) (challenging Justice Scalia's constitutional claims).
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debate both on the Court279 and among commentators. 280 The vigor and heat of the
lofty, high-stakes debate, however, has obscured a fundamental point in legislative
analysis, a point with special significance to the discussion here.
In addressing the punishment question in Kansas v. Hendricks, the Court's
raison d'etre was to evaluate the Kansas Legislature's purpose in enacting the
SVPA, an objective that differs in important ways from the interpretative mission
of determining legislative intent or meaning. The Court in Hendricks was not
sitting in its interpretative capacity as "agent, ,281 asking how the Kansas Legisla-
ture itself would answer a question prompted by an ambiguity arising under the
involuntary commitment provisions of the SVPA, and seeking to give effect to that
will. 282 Rather, the Court was asked whether the Kansas Legislature's purpose was
to punish the already-punished Leroy Hendricks. From this perspective, the SVPA
was a "purposive" act, 28' consistent with Justice Frankfurter's belief that all
"[1]egislation has an aim; it seeks to obviate some mischief, to supply an
inadequacy, to effect a change of policy, to formulate a plan of government.,
284
279. See Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 845,
846 (1992) (predicting that the Court's use of legislative history "to resolve even difficult cases may soon be the
exception rather than the rule."); Gregory E. Maggs, The Secret Decline of Legislative History: Has Someone
Heard a Voice Crying in the Wilderness?, 1994 PuB. INT. L. REv. 57, 58 ("Reversing a trend of many years of
increasing reliance on legislative history, the Court now appears to be cutting down on the practice."); Thomas W.
Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 351, 355-57 (1994) (describing
rise in textualist approach on Court); Pierce, supra note 271, at 750 (same).
280. To characterize the literature on the debate as "voluminous" would be an understatement. See e.g.,
Eskridge, supra note 278, at 621; Jerry L. Mashaw, Textualism, Constitutionalism, and the Interpretation of
Federal Statutes, 32 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 827 (1991); George H. Taylor, Structural Textualism, 75 B.U. L. Rev.
321 (1995); Nicholas S. Zeppos, Justice Scalia's Textualism: The "New" Legal Process, 12 CARDOzO L. REv.
1597 (1991).
281. See Frank J. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term-Foreward: The Court and the Economic
System, 98 HARV. L. Rn'. 4, 60 (1984) (stating that courts are to serve as "honest agents of the political branches"
whose mission is to "carry out decisions they do not make").
282. See, e.g., Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 713 (1975) ("Our objective ... is to ascertain the
congressional intent and give effect to the legislative will."); United States v. American Trucking Ass'n, 310 U.S.
534, 542 (1940) ("In the interpretation of statutes, the function of the courts is easily stated. It is to construe the
language so as to give effect to the intent of Congress."); I.C.C. v. Baird, 194 U.S. 25, 38 (1904) ("The object of
construction... is to ascertain the legislative intent, and, if possible, to effectuate the purposes of the
lawmakers").
283. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 104 (1990) (referring to legislative acts as
"purposive utterances"). See also HENRY M. HART & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 1253-54 (William
M. Eskridge, Jr. & Phillip P. Frickey eds., 1994) [hereinafter HART & SACKS]; T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating
Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REv. 20, 24 (1988); Phillip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat:
The Revival of Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 77 MINN4. L. REv. 241, 249-50.
284. Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Readings of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REv. 527, 538-39 (1947).
Judge Learned Hand similarly observed:
[I]t is one of the surest indexes of a mature and developed jurisprudence not to make a fortress out
of the dictionary; but to remember that statutes always have some purpose or object to accomplish,
whose sympathetic and imaginative discovery is the surest guide to their meaning.
Cabell v. Markham, 148 R2d 737, 739 (2d Cir.), affid, 326 U.S. 404 (1945); see also HENRY M. HART & ALBERT
M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1156 (1958) ("Law is
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The interpretative precept that statutes have general purposes as well as specific
intents (or meanings) is well-established in Anglo-American law, tracing its
origins to the "Mischief Rule" of sixteenth century Britain where courts inter-
preted statutes on the basis of the "mischief and defect[s]" they sought to
redress.285 Down the years, a long line of prominent American jurists and
academics have recognized this "purposive" distinction in statutory interpreta-
tion, 6 including: Justices Holmes287 and Frankfurter; 28 8 Judges Jerome Frank
289
and Learned Hand; 290 and professors such as Lon Fuller,29 ' Max Radin,292 Henry
M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks. 2 9 3 More recently, Professors William Eskridge,294
Alexander Aleinikoff,295 and Ronald Dworkin, 296 as well as Justice Scalia2 97 and Judge
a doing of something, a purposive activity, a continuous striving to solve the basic problems of social living ....
Every statute must be conclusively proved to be a purposive act.").
285. See Heydon's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 637, 638, 3 Co 7a (Exch. 1884); 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTAR-
ms *87-*88 (stating that courts should consider the "mischief" at which a statute was aimed). See also DONALD
GIFFORD, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 43-57 (1990); John F Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine,
97 COLUM. L. REv. 673, 733 n.253 (1997) ("Courts have traditionally examined the events precipitating a statute's
enactment to gain insight into its meaning.").
Although early British courts typically did not examine legislative histories, principally because none existed,
their interpretative strategy extended well beyond the strict text of the statute itself. See, e.g., Stowel v. Lord
Zouch, 75 Eng. Rep. 536, 556 (C.P. 1569) ("[Elvery thing which is within the intent of the makers of the Act,
although it be not within the letter, is as strongly within the Act as that which is within the letter .. ").
286. For an insightful treatment of the intellectual lineage of the "purposive" approach, and the role legislative
history has played in it, see William N. Eskridge, Legislative History Values, 66 Crn.-KENr L. Rev. 365, 391-95
(1990). Earlier in this Section, broad reference was made to the "Intentionalist" camp. One commentator recently
offered this refinement:
A purposivist judge finds law by measuring a statute's language against the statute's purpose. For
the task of discerning purpose, legislative history is a common choice. An intentionalist finds law
by reconstructing congressional intent, also frequently relying on legislative history. Intentional-
ism differs from purposivism because a statute can be interpreted to have a broader purpose
beyond the one intended.
Roger Colinvaux, Comment, What Is Law? A Search for Legal Meaning and Good Judging Under a Textualist
Lens, 72 IND. J. L. 1133, 1133 (1997).
287. See United States v. Whitridge, 197 U.S. 135, 143 (1905) ("[Tlhe general purpose [of a statute] is a more
important aid to the meaning than any rule which grammar or formal logic may lay down.").
288. See Frankfurter, supra note 284, at 527.
289. See Jerome Frank, Words and Music: Some Remarks on Statutory Interpretation, 47 COLUM. L. REv. 527
(1947).
290. See, e.g., Borella v. Borden Co., 145 F.2d 63, 64 (2d Cir. 1944), affid, 325 U.S. 679 (1945).
291. See generally Lon Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 HARv. L REv. 616 (1949).
292. See generally Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARv. L. REv. 863 (1930). Alexander Bickel, for
his part, wrote that when seeking to discern the "purpose" of an enactment, use of legislative history permits
discovery of "which one of a number of related policies-all permissible on principle-the legislature intended to
effectuate." ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 62 (1962).
293. See HART & SACKS, supra note 283, at 1378.
294. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Legislative History Values, 66 Cm.-KENT L. Rav. 365,439-40 (1990).
295. See Aleinikoff, supra note 283, at 24.
296. See RONALD DwomuN, LAW'S EMPnoz 330 (1986).
297. See ArrN'T SCALIA, A MATrER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 144 (1997) ("[Tlhe
import of language depends on its context, which includes the occasion for, and hence the evident purpose of, its
utterance.").
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Richard Posner,29 8 have acknowledged this important difference.
The distinction offered fifty years ago by then-Professor Archibald Cox between
the two forms of legislative "intent" retains its usefulness today:
In one sense, [intent] carries a concept of purpose and signifies the general aim
or policy which pervades a statute but has yet to find specific application... In
a second sense [intent] ... carries the more immediate concept of meaning and
indicates the specific, particularized application which the statute was "in-
tended" to be given.2
9 9
Professor Cox added:
[slome such purpose lies behind all intelligible legislation, for while individual
congressmen may occasionally disagree even as to the broad purposes to be
accomplished by a bill... their conflicting views may be fairly said to blend in
a resultant, just as their differences regarding the words to be enacted are
merged by the legislative process into a final product.
300
To illustrate his point, Cox examined the Fair Labor Standards Act. The "purpose"
of the FLSA, he observed, was to "raise the standards of living of workers engaged
in interstate commerce or in the production of goods for commerce." 30 ' However,
when Congress "defined production to include 'any process or occupation neces-
sary to the production thereof,' Congress 'intended' (in the second sense) to make
the act applicable to maintenance workers in the executive offices of interstate
producers." 3
02
To the extent "intent" comes into play at all with regard to the punishment
question, then, it does so in the form of "institutionalized intention," which
Professor Ronald Dworkin characterizes as "a policy or principle.., enacted so
that it becomes part of the legislation., 30 3 Contrasted against "collective under-
standing," which Dworkin rightfully deems an inscrutable "psychological" con-.
struct, institutionalized intention is embedded in the legislative enactment, 3°4 and
298. See PosNMI supra note 283, at 104; Richard A. Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes
and the Constitution, 49 U. CH. L. REv. 263, 272 (1982).
299. Archibald Cox, Judge Learned Hand and the Interpretation of Statutes, 60 HARv. L. REv. 370, 370-71
(1947). To state the distinction, however, is not to understand how the different types of "intent" differ. This is
because "[i]ntent is unfortunately a confusing word, carrying within it both the teleological concept of purpose
and the more immediate concept of meaning.... Purpose and meaning commonly react upon each other. Their
exact differentiation would require an extended philosophical essay." James M. Landis, A Note on "Statutory
Interpretation," 43 HARv. L. REv. 886, 888 (1930).
300. Cox, supra note 299, at 370-71.
301. Id. at371.
302. Id. (footnote omitted).
303. RONALD DWORKN, A MATrER OF PRIN C PLE 320 (1985). See also Taylor, supra note 280, at 340
("[M]eaning is to be found in the world of the text .... A statute is a public act whose meaning is not necessarily
the same as the sum of the private intentions of those who voted in its favor.").
304. See DWORKIN, supra note 296, at 322. See also DWORKIN, supra note 303, at 342-54. Alexander Bickel
identified this distinction as well. According to Professor Bickel, inquiry into the "dominant purpose" of a
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is susceptible of interpretation. 30 5
Of course, the foregoing recognition does not resolve precisely how "purpose"
is to be meaningfully identified. As noted, the Court has frequently resorted to
legislative materials to assist in its interpretation of statutes.30 6 Over time it has
also been apparent that even within the body of legislative sources there exists a
hierarchy, with committee reports and sponsors' statements being considered
especially probative.30 7 Less consensus exists over the use of floor debates and
statements of non-sponsors who speak on behalf of a bill, the concern stemming
from the practical difficulty of inferring intent from numerous speakers.30 8
legislative act "need not be regarded as an attempt to diagnose true motive, as if legislative action were a neurotic
symptom that the Court is obliged to trace to its cause." BICKEL, supra note 273, at 208-09. Professor Bickel was
thus at pains to avoid Justice Cardozo's admonition in United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 299 (1935), that
the Court should not partake in "psychoanalysis" of the "motives of a legislative body or assume them to be
wrongful," a field to which the Court is "unaccustomed." Id.
The Court itself very recently reiterated this important distinction in NCUA v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust, 118 S.
Ct. 927 (1998). In NCUA, banks sought to limit the ability of credit unions to enlist members from businesses
unaffiliated with the existing credit union membership base. A threshold issue was whether the banks had standing
to litigate their claim. In finding standing to exist, the Court, with Justice Scalia joining Justice Thomas's majority
opinion, relied heavily on the legislative history of the Federal Credit Union Act and the historical context of the
1930's in which it originated. Id. at 937.
305. William Eskridge similarly observes that the legislative record is significant for its "truth value," and
offers the Court's historic heavy reliance on the writings of Madison, Hamilton, and Jay in THm FEDERALIST
PAPERS by way of analogy. The collected essays, first printed anonymously in newspapers of the time, have
become an interpretative benchmark for the Court in its constitutional analyses, notwithstanding the fact that only
one of the authors was a ratifying delegate in New York's consideration of the U.S. Constitution:
Just as the Federalist's defenses of constitutional choices are often persuasive evidence of
constitutional policies, so legislative history can sometimes provide guidance to the statutory
interpreter by giving an indication of widely shared designs. And just as the essays by Madison and
Hamilton set forth insightful views about political theory, legislative history is often illuminating
for its normative value.
William M. Eskridge, Jr., Legislative History Values, 66 Cm.-KENT L. REV. 365, 439-40 (1990). See also
Manning, supra note 285, at 733 ("Just as a book or newspaper or law review article may reveal the reasons for
passing legislation, so too might the legislative history, which is itself produced by well-informed observers on
the scene.").
306. Professor Cox notes that "even during periods in which legislative materials were not accepted for the
purpose of showing the correct interpretation of a statute, the Supreme Court referred to them to disclose its
general purpose." Cox, supra note 299, at 379 n.27 (citing, by way of example, Holy Trinity Church v. Unitd
States, 143 U.S. 457, 463-65 (1892); United States v. Union Pacific Railroad, 91 U.S. 72, 79 (1875); Preston v.
Browder, 1 Wheat. 115 (1816)).
307. See NoRMAN J. SINGER, 2A SurHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 48.15, at 364 (1992); Eskridge,
supra note 278, at 637-38. See also Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 43 n.7 (1986) (citing committee reports as
"authoritative"); North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 526-27 (1982) ("Although the statements of
one legislator made during a debate may not be controlling, ... Senator Bayh's remarks, as those of the sponsor of
the language ultimately enacted, are an authoritative guide to the statute's construction."); J.W. Bateson Co. v.
United States ex rel. Bd. of Trustees of the Nat'l Automatic Sprinkler Indus. Pension Fund, 434 U.S. 586, 591
(1978) (attaching special significance to key legislators' input).
308. The Second Circuit recently expressed this difficulty: "Since any member can make a floor speech, there
is scant utility in totaling up the number of speeches on each side of an issue and attempting to divine
congressional intent from the quantity of Congressional Record pages generated on either side." Butts v. City of
New York Dep't of Hous., 990 F.2d 1397, 1405 (2d Cir. 1993).
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However, the Court has often looked to floor speeches to infer legislative purpose,
and lent prominent effect to the utterances of mere proponents of legislation.3 °9
Nor has the Court limited itself to the statements of persons with a voting role in
the legislative process; it has frequently examined the views of non-legislators that
played no express role in the drafting process.310
The pitfalls of accepting such legislative grist at face value are well known, as
the New Textualists and others have made clear.3 1' But even the most died-in-the-
wool among them concede the importance of the legislative record in the
interpretative process.3 12 As Professor George Taylor recently observed, "al-
though use of legislative history can produce inaccuracies in interpretation, so can
recourse to the statute alone.", 3 13 New Textualist stalwart Justice Antonin Scalia
himself recently parsed the legislative record to infer congressional purpose. In
United States v. Fausto,31 4 the Court considered whether the grievance procedures
309. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Public Employment Rel. Bd., 485 U.S. 589, 595-96 (1988)
(discussing statements by sponsors); Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minnesota Pub. Int. Res. Group, 468 U.S. 841,
849-56 (1984) (same). The Court also has been slow to consider the statements of opponents to proposed
legislation. See, e.g., Minnesota Pub. Int. Res. Group, 468 U.S. at 856 n.15 (recognizing that such "statements are
entitled to little, if any, weight").
310. See Allison C. Giles, Note, The Value of Nonlegislators' Contributions to Legislative History, 79 GEo.
L.J. 359 (1990) (discussing the Court's reliance on nonlegislators' views and providing a non-exhaustive list of 50
cases between 1904 and 1989 in which the Court considered such materials). William Eskridge has commented
that "[n]onlegislator statements were most useful to the Court as evidence that the statute embodied a certain
political consensus or compromise whose details were worked out outside the formal legislative process."
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMic STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 220 (1994). Professor Eskridge also observes
that the Burger Court even indulged in" 'subsequent legislative history,' the interpretation expressed by members
of Congress after a statute has been enacted." Id. at 221.
311. See supra notes 270-80 and accompanying text. See also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Legislative History
Values, 66 Cm.-KENT L. REv. 365, 413 (1990) ("legislative history ... is not a fixed context. Like the statute
itself, it is subject to interpretation. What the legislative history 'is' depends upon what the interpreter physically
finds, what she then selects from the materials available, what background values or assumptions influence her
reading of the materials, and how individual materials fit with the big picture.").
312. Even arch-Textualist Judge Easterbrook has observed that context can be key in ascertaining statutory
"meaning":
Legislation speaks across the decades, during which legal institutions and linguistic conventions
change. To decode words one must frequently reconstruct the legal and political culture of the
drafters. Legislative history may be invaluable in revealing the setting of the enactment and the
assumptions its authors entertained about how their words would be understood.
In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1342 (7th Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook, J.). Professor George Taylor recently observed,
[A]s textualism increasingly recognizes, textual analysis cannot rest on a text's internal context
alone; terms gain meaning through interpretation in light of larger external contexts.... To the
extent, however, that textualism acknowledges the inextricable role of external context in
determining textual meaning, it must also admit that interpretation can function only on criteria
outside the text.
Taylor, supra note 280, at 377-78.
313. Id. at 381 (footnote omitted). See also Colinvaux, supra note 286, at 1137 ("Like the meaning of words,
statutory interpretation is contextual.... [I]n order to understand what it means to interpret a statute one should
look to the context in which it occurs: the process of lawmaking.").
314. 484 U.S. 439 (1988).
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set forth in the Civil Service Reform Act constituted the exclusive remedy for civil
servants aggrieved by personnel actions. Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia
looked to an accompanying Senate Report to infer that Congress acted with the
purpose of replacing the pre-Act system of redress; this, in tandem with the highly
detailed remedial framework of the Act, implicitly barred alternative pre-existing
remedies.315
Nor has the Court limited its review to the narrow confines of the actual
legislative record. As in Cummings v. Missouri and Ex Parte Garland, and
consistent with the "Mischief Rule," the Court has looked to the broader historical
record to gauge the originating conditions giving birth to statutes.316 In 1930,
Professor James Landis colorfully spoke to the necessity of looking to the larger
forces at play:
A statute rarely stands alone. Back of Minerva was the brain of Jove, and
behind Venus the spume of the ocean. So of the statute, it is the culmination
often of long legislative processes.... Such material frequently affords a guide
to the intent of the legislature conceived of in terms of purpose. To deal, for
example, with the Trade Disputes Act of 1906 without regard to the fact that it
followed upon a Liberal-Labor victory, would be to thwart known legislative
hopes and desires .... To ignore legislative processes and legislative history in
the processes of interpretation, is to turn one's back on whatever history may
reveal as to the direction of the political and economic forces of our time.
317
This sensitivity to legislative context--encompassing not just the narrow legisla-
tive history of a provision but also the broader social and political events giving
rise to it-is especially appropriate in ex post facto analysis. Statutes do not take
form in a vacuum, an understanding inherent in the Ex Post Facto Clause itself. Ex
post facto analysis, in short, demands keen sensitivity to the social, economic, and
political context in which legislative initiatives take root and gain approval.318
315. See id. at 444.
316. As one leading authority on statutory interpretation put it:
It is established practice in American legal processes to consider relevant information concerning
the historical background of enactment .... These extrinsic aids may show the circumstances
under which the statute was passed, the mischief at which it was aimed and the object it was
supposed to achieve.
NORMAN J. SINGER, 2A SUTHERLAND ON STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 48.03, at 315 (5th ed. 1992) (citations
omitted). See Butts v. City of New York Dep't of Hous., 990 E2d 1397, 1405 (2d Cir. 1993) (finding
"enlightenment" in the "sequence of events" leading to passage of statute in question); CAss R. SuNSTEIN, AFrER
THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE 186 (1990) ("Inevitably, statutory construction
is an exercise of practical reason in which text, structure, history, and purpose interact with the background
understandings in the legal culture."); W. David Slawson, Legislative History and the Need to Bring Statutory
Interpretation Under the Rule of Law, 44 STAN. L. REV. 383, 414 (1992) ("All expressions gain their meanings
from context.").
317. Landis, supra note 299, at 891-92.
318. Implicit in the Court's use of the legislative record is the recognition that the paramount importance of the
Court's inherent duty to interpret the Constitution trumps separation of powers and pragmatic concerns that
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Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Srvs. 31 9 a bill of attainder case, is a modem
exemplar of how the Court should scrutinize legislative context in ex post facto
cases. In Nixon, former President Richard M. Nixon challenged the constitutional-
ity of the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act (PRMPA), which
permitted the government to take custody of his presidential papers and materials.
The PRMPA in effect abrogated an individual depository agreement Nixon had
signed with the General Services Administration under which Nixon would retain
all legal rights in his materials and under which he permit the destruction of some
of those materials. With the Watergate investigation looming, Nixon sued to enjoin
implementation of the PRMPA, arguing inter alia that it singled him out for
retroactive "punishment" in violation of the Bill of Attainder Clause.
In seeking to determine if the PRMPA "further[ed] nonpunitive legislative
purposes," the Court framed its standard as follows: "[w]here such legitimate
legislative purposes do not appear, it is reasonable to conclude that punishment of
individuals disadvantaged by the enactment was the purpose of the decisionmak-
ers.''320 The Nixon Court carefully scrutinized House and Senate Reports it
believed made clear that Congress, rather than seeking to punish Nixon, instead
legitimately acted to preserve Nixon's papers for historical, judicial, and civic
reasons.321 In addition, the Court found that this purpose was evident from the
express terms of the PRMPA itself.
322
[It seems clear that the actions of both Houses of Congress were predomi-
nantly precipitated by a resolve to undo the recently negotiated [General
Services Administration] agreement, the terms of which departed from the
practice of former Presidents in that they expressly contemplated the destruc-
tion of certain Presidential materials .... The relevant Committee Reports
thus cast no aspersions on [Nixon's] personal conduct and contain no condem-
nation of his behavior as meriting the infliction of punishment.
32 3
perhaps otherwise discourage such inquiry in other contexts. Separation of powers concerns do not arise when the
"impact is justified by an overriding need to promote objectives within the constitutional authority" of the courts.
See Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977). Justice Brennan has noted that this "more
pragmatic, flexible approach" traces its intellectual lineage to James Madison and Justice Joseph Story, and had
its more recent exposition in United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) and Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 US. 579 (1952). See also JoHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
135 (1980) (arguing that the judiciary plays a central role in representing the rights of the politically
disempowered); J. Morris Clark, Legislative Motivation and Fundamental Rights in Constitutional Law, 15 S.kit
DIEoo L. REv. 953, 967-68 (1978) (discussing central role of courts as arbiters between citizens and lawmakers in
a constitutional system). The courts, for that matter, are also not obliged to defer to the illicit or otherwise
improper motivations of the citizenry, the views of which are theoretically reflected in the legislature. See, e.g.,
Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984).
319. 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
320. Id. at 475-76.
321. See id. at 476-77.
322. See id. at 477.
323. Id. at 479.
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The Nixon Court also looked to the Senate floor debates, giving special
emphasis to the statement of a "key sponsor" of the PRMPA, North Carolina
Senator Sam Ervin, who, in response to an opponent's attempt to mischaracterize
safeguards contained in the legislation and brand it as a bill of attainder, "expressly
den[ied] any intention ... of imposing punitive sanctions." '324 This evidence, the
Court found, distinguished Nixon from its prior bill of attainder decision in United
States v. Lovett,32 5 "where a House Report expressly characterized individuals as
'subversive... and... unfit.., to continue in Government employment.' ,,326
The Court, however, was at pains to make clear that a "formal legislative
announcement of moral blameworthiness or punishment" was not a prerequisite to
concluding that the enactment constituted a bill of attainder.327 But at the same
time,
the decided absence from the legislative history of any congressional senti-
ments expressive of this purpose is probative of nonpunitive intentions and
largely undercuts a major concern that prompted the bill of attainder prohibi-
tion: the fear that the legislature, in seeking to pander to an inflamed popular
constituency, will find it expedient openly to assume the mantle of judge--or,
worse still, lynch mob.328
The Nixon Court's exacting inquiry was faithful to the animating concerns
surrounding the Bill of Attainder Clause, concerns nearly identical to those of the
Ex Post Facto Clause, and which dominated the Court's seminal ex post facto
cases, most notably Cummings v. Missouri and Ex parte Garland.329 Unfortu-
nately, this sensitivity was notably absent from Hendricks. The next section
illustrates how a more searching inquiry into legislative purpose, like that carried
out in Nixon, could have been conducted on the basis of the Hendricks record.
D. Hendricks Reexamined
In Hendricks, the Court satisfied itself that "Kansas's objective" in passing the
Sexual Predators Act was "civil," essentially because Kansas stated it was so and
because the SVPA was inserted in the probate code.33 D This "manifest intent" was
not overcome by the "clearest proof" that the SVPA was "so punitive either in
purpose or effect as to negate [Kansas's] intention to deem it 'civil.' ,,331 In
reaching its conclusion, however, the Court flatly ignored undisputed, plenary
324. Id. at 479-80 & n.44.
325. 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
326. Id. at 480 (quoting United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 312 (1946)).
327. Id.
328. Id. (citation omitted). The Court noted, but ultimately discounted, the volatile historic events swirling
around the genesis of the PRMPA. See id. at 483-84.
329. See supra notes 118-22 and accompanying text.
330. Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2082 (1997).
331. Id.
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evidence in the record raising serious questions about the putative civil purpose of
the Kansas SVPA.
First, the Court failed to recognize that the SVPA was part of a larger package of
harsh determinate sentencing laws that at once increased criminal penalties for
future sex offenses and mandated enhanced penalties for "predatory sex offend-
ers. " 332 These demonstrably criminal sanctions, however, targeted only future sex
offenders; left untouched were the small but not insignificant population of
offenders already imprisoned under older, more lenient indeterminate sentencing
laws. One Kansas prosecutor summed up the legislative strategy as follows:
It is not difficult to understand why legislators are reluctant to stop after simply
increasing the criminal sentences that may be imposed on sex offenders in the
future. Such laws will indeed punish and incapacitate future offenders and may
deter some potential offenders from ever committing sex offenses. But it is
difficult to inform constituents that there is nothing more that can be done to
protect the public from past offenders who are now being or soon will be
released from prison.3 3 3
In sum, it was at prior offenders, like Hendricks, that the SVPA's involuntary
commitment scheme was directed, lending the SVPA a strong criminal cast.334
Second, the Court totally ignored extensive evidence in the record of unabashed
expressions of punitive intent in the legislative evolution of the SVPA, a great deal
of which emanated from key players in the legislative process. For instance, in
testifying before the Kansas Legislature on behalf of the SVPA, Kansas Attorney
General Robert Stephan stated:
Most new laws against criminal conduct tend to provide punishment after the
victimization has occurred. Senate Bill 525 will act prospectively and be
preventive of criminal conduct and not just punitive. You have a rare opportu-
nity to pass a law that will keep dangerous sex offenders confined past their
scheduled prison sentence. As I am convinced none of them should ever be
released, I believe you, as legislators, have an obligation to enact laws that will
protect our citizens through incapacitation of dangerous offenders.335
Stephan's successor, current Attorney General Carla Stovall, described the SVPA's
goal as keeping sexual offenders "locked up indefinitely ' 33 6 because Kansas
could not "open [its] prison doors and let these animals back into [its] communi-
332. See McAllister, supra note 23, at 427 (noting that sentence enhancements and the SVPA were enacted in
"response to the Stephanie Schmidt case.").
333. Id. at 434.
334. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3810(c) (making escape pending "predator" status trial an "aggravated"
felony; no similar penalty associated with escape from standard civil commitment).
335. Brief for the American Psychiatric Ass'n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Leroy Hendricks at 13-14,
Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997) (Nos. 95-1649, 95-9075).
336. Brief of the American Civil Liberities Union, et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 23,
Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997) (No. 95-1649).
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ties.",337 Extensive testimony from a long list of mental health professionals,
including representatives of the agency theoretically responsible for treatment
under the SVPA, confirmed that the result of commitment would very likely be
indefinite confinement, rather than treatment in the hope of release.338 The reasons
for this ranged from the practical reality that mental health professionals would be
extremely reluctant to certify that offenders could ever be safely returned to the
community,"' to the acknowledged lack of effective treatment in Kansas for
pedophiles.34
The SVPA itself became law amid a landslide of support. The Kansas House
approved the legislation 101-23 and the Senate 40-0, in a single day,34' largely
due to the efforts of the Schmidt Task Force, which proposed the SVPA to the
legislature for consideration. The Task Force included the following: the mother,
father, and sister of Ms. Schmidt; Kansas Attorney General Robert Stephan; a local
district attorney; law enforcement personnel; the State Victims' Rights Coordina-
tor; parole board members; probation officers; legislators; and several concerned
citizens. It did not include any mental health professionals. 342 When one Task
Force member was confronted with the reality that, because effective treatment
was lacking, commitment would de facto amount to a life term, the response was
"So be it." 343
337. Id.
338. Brief for the National Ass'n of Criminal Defense Lawyers and the Kansas Ass'n of Criminal Defense




341. Kelly A. McCaffrey, Comment, The Civil Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators in Kansas: A
Modern Law for Modern imes, 42 KAN. L. REV. 887, 888 (1994). Bills proposing involuntary post-confinement
commitment were proposed in the 1991 and 1992 Kansas legislative sessions, but were defeated both times in the
House. The Schmidt murder and rape ignited new interest, resulting in the law's ultimate convincing margin of
victory in 1994. See id. at 889.
342. Id. at 887 n.2.
343. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2087 (Kennedy, J. concurring) (citing testimony of Schmidt Task Force Member
Jim Blaufuss). It is interesting to note that the State of Washington's sexual predator law was borne of strikingly
similar public outrage and fury, likewise stemming from a high-profile sexual assault. As in Kansas, the Governor
appointed a task force, and the task force's proposals steam-rolled through the Legislature (by a unanimous vote).
See David Boerner, Confronting Violence: In the Act and In the World, 15 U. PUGET SoUND L. REV. 525, 575
(1992). Mr. Boemer, a task force member and chief drafter of the statute, commented:
I had no doubt that if the legislature was to extend the length of the sentences previously imposed,
the courts would find the legislation unconstitutional. While the members of the Task Force could
accept the legal judgment, they could not accept the result.
Id. at 550.
A similar history characterized the evolution of New Jersey's sexual predator law. See Claudine M. Leone, New
Jersey Assembly Bill 155, A Bill Allowing the Civil Commitment of Violent Sex Offenders After the Completion of
a Criminal Sentence, 18 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 890 (1994). The New Jersey Legislature, embroiled in an election
year, and under an emergency suspension of its rules that resulted in no hearings in the State House and limited
hearings in the Senate, approved the legislation within a mere three months of Megan Kanka's death. See
Symposium, Critical Perspectives on Megan's Law: Protection vs. Privacy, 13 N.Y.L.S. J. HUM. RTS. 1, 57
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Finally, in a curious twist for the Supreme Court's conservatives, who otherwise
voice great concerns for federalism and comity, the Hendricks Court utterly
ignored the Kansas Supreme Court's evaluation of the purpose driving its own
Legislature. The Kansas court found it "clear that the primary objective of the Act
is to continue incarceration and not to provide treatment."' 34 4 The Hendricks
majority's inexplicable neglect of the Kansas court's authoritative understanding
deviated from well-settled law. Addressing an ex post facto challenge in 1937 for a
unanimous Court, Justice Stone stated:
This Court, in applying the ex post facto prohibition of the Federal Constitu-
tion to state laws, accepts the meaning ascribed to them by the highest court of
the state. But when their meaning is thus established, whether the standards of
punishment set up before and after the commission of an offense differ, and
whether the later standard is more onerous than the earlier within the meaning
of the constitutional prohibition, are federal questions which this Court will
determine for itself.
345
Altogether, the record in Hendricks provided strong reason to be wary of
accepting the Kansas Legislature's reflexive assurance that it was seeking only to
"treat," not punish, sexual offenders. The SVPA originated with the gruesome rape
and murder of a young woman by a released "sexual predator," and little occurred
in the evolution of the SVPA that was inconsistent with the initial punitive impulse.
At a minimum, as suggested by Justice Breyer in his Hendricks dissent, the Court
should have been obliged to "place particular importance upon those features that
would likely distinguish between a basically punitive and basically nonpunitive
purpose.", 346 The compelling evidence of punitive purpose in the record, consid-
ered with the other statutory-based indicia of intent (e.g., the fact that involuntary
confinement is involved; the fact that individuals are stigmatized as "predators";
the fact that "treatment" is imposed only on persons previously convicted of a
criminal offense, at the end of their sentences; and the at best secondary treatment
objective) belied the Kansas Legislature's ostensible nonpunitive design.
The SVPA doubtless served to extend the time (perhaps indefinitely) during
which Kansans could live without fear of a visit from Leroy Hendricks. But the
(1997). See also Robert Hanley, Megan's Law is Questioned as Injunction is Extended, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 1996,
at B6 (recounting that legislators rushed bill through session with scant hearings in response to plea of Megan's
parents and supporters), Bill Sanderson, Glamour Politics Isn't the Name of the Game, THE RECORD (New Jersey),
Sept. 3, 1995, at 05 ("After a tearful testimonial from Megan Kanka's mother, the lawmakers ignored the few
witnesses who raised questions.").
344. In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 136 (Kan. 1996).
345. Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. 397, 400 (1937). Justice Breyer, dissenting, also challenged the
Hendricks majority for this blatant inconsistency. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2092-93 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
See also Romer v. Evans, 517 S. Ct. 620, 624 (1996) (holding state court provides "authoritative construction");
United States Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 829 (1995) (same); Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 367
(1986) (same); Russell v. Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079, 1082 n.3 (9th Cir. 1997) (same).
346. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2091 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Hendricks Court simply refused to acknowledge, let alone weigh, the indicia of
punitive purpose, and instead uncritically rubber-stamped the assurance of the
Kansas Legislature. In doing so, it ignored the core purpose of the Ex Post Facto
Clause, the very constitutional provision it was charged with interpreting and
applying.
VI. CONCLUSION
If the Ex Post Facto Clause is to remain, in James Madison's words, a
fundamental "constitutional bulwark in favor of personal security and private
rights,",347 it must be treated as such by the Court. Since its origin, the Clause has
guarded against legislative vindictiveness, a threat no less pertinent today than at
the time of the Framers. Indeed, parallels between Southern sympathizers of the
1860s, Communists of the 1950s, and chronic sexual offenders of the 1990s are
obvious. 34 8 Given the politically charged atmosphere in which the Kansas Legisla-
ture enacted its Sexually Violent Predator Act, one would have expected a keen
sensitivity on the part of the Court to legislative purpose, especially given the array
of other indicia pointing to the punitive nature of the SVPA. But such sensitivity
was not forthcoming from the Hendricks majority.
With Hendricks, the Court endorsed a constitutional end-run. Faced with the
imminent release of Leroy Hendricks in 1994, Kansas "cut corners ' 349 and used
its newly adopted SVPA to revive an option it inexplicably passed up in 1984,
namely, the incapacitation of Hendricks "until he exhaled his last breath and his
spirit departed this earth ....- ,35o Fairly viewed, while certainly an innovative
"gap-filling" strategy,351 the Kansas SVPA represents nothing more than an
347. TRE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 299 (James Madison).
348. This point was eloquently made by New Jersey Supreme Court Justice Stein in a case addressing whether
the sex offender registration and notification provisions of "Megan's Law" violated the Ex Post Facto Clause:
The Constitution's prohibition against ex post facto laws reflects an enduring value that transcends
the most pressing concerns of this or any day and age. Today, our concern is with prior sex
offenders; in the 1950s the legislative concern focused on Communists; and in the late 1860s
Congress was determined to punish legislatively those who had supported the Confederacy. Future
legislatures will doubtlessly find reasons to deal harshly with other groups that pose an apparent
threat to the public safety.
Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 441 (N.J. 1995) (Stein, J., dissenting). Another commentator put it this way: "As
America moves into the twenty-first century, we must determine to what extent individual liberties must be
sacrificed for the common good. Ideals of liberty and privacy are stretched to the limit as modern fears of street
crime merge with ancient fears of plague." Richards, supra note 18, at 329.
349. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2098 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that the Ex Post Facto Clause "provides an
assurance that, where so significant a restriction of an individual's basic freedoms is at issue, a State cannot cut
corners. Rather, the legislature must hew to the Constitution's liberty-protecting line.").
350. In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 139 (Lockett, J., concurring).
351. Schulhofer, supra note 129, at 78-79. Professor Schulhofer has observed that in one sense the concern
over sexual predator statutes is of "little long-term import," because increasingly, the states have moved away
from indeterminate sentences, instead imposing draconian sentences on chronic offenders such as Hendricks from
the outset. At the same time, writing before Hendricks was issued, Schulhofer noted that concerns will persist with
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instance of shrewd legislative legerdemain, and the Supreme Court's approval of it
surely bodes ill for the future. Where this sort of legislative behavior will end is
difficult to say, for while it is sex offenders that garner our attention today, society
has no shortage of targets on which to focus its anxiety and disdain.3 5 2
Some time soon, yet another legislature will succumb, in Chief Justice Mar-
shall's words, to "feelings of the moment... those sudden and strong passions to
which men are exposed.",35 3 The potential political gain is simply too great, and
the political risk too small, for events to be otherwise.3 54 While we would like to
"first offenders and less serious offenders.. . as the state [sic] may determine to seek long-term incapacitation of
those offenders after conviction or when they reach the end of the single-digit prison or jail sentence they are
likely to face in any foreseeable penal regime." Id. at 76 n.44.
In this regard, it is worthwhile to note that the number of sexual offenders potentially coming within the net is
not small. Data from Minnesota, for instance, indicate that 40% of persons sentenced in 1992 for first-degree
sexual conduct did not receive prison time. See Johnson, supra note 21, at 1188. Those receiving prison terms
averaged sentences of 10.5 years, and of the defendants with three or more prior convictions, almost 17% served
less than one year or no time whatsoever. Id.
352. At oral argument, Justice O'Connor inquired of Kansas Attorney General Stovall: "How would this be
cabined in the future... if we uphold it? Could a state lock up any violent offender who's diagnosed as having a
mental abnormality of some kind ... and at the same time be likely to commit more crimes in the future?"
Transcript at * 4.
Yet another consequence of this "blurring" of criminal sanctions is that Eighth Amendment proportionality
analysis will be effectively precluded. See Dubber, supra note 29, at 136 ("IT]he distinctions in American law
between (civil) commitment and (criminal) punishment and between punitive and remedial commitment insulate
the State from challenges to the legitimacy of its punishment practices .... [T]he State manages to escape
scrutiny of its punitive power by classifying its coercive practices as anything but punishment."). For instance, a
first-time sex offender can now receive a determinate sentence of ten years and thereafter be "civilly" committed for the
remainder of his life, without being permitting to challenge the State's intervention on Eighth Amendment grounds.
353. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 137-38 (1810). See also Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S.
244, 266 (1994) (warning that a legislature's "responsivity to political pressures poses a risk that it may be
tempted to use retroactive legislation as a means of retribution against unpopular groups or individuals.");
BENJAMIN N. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 83 (1921) ("Statutes are designed to meet the
fugitive exigencies of the hour.").
Not surprisingly, Hendricks has not fallen on deaf ears in legislatures across the nation. See Sex Crime Laws
Given Free Rein, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 27, 1997, at Al (noting that Hendricks has "bolster[ed]" existing predator laws
"while strengthening efforts to pass such laws in 30 other states").
354. Paul Brest has recognized the "practical problems that confront a legislator whose constitutional
obligations conflict with the political demands of his office," and has further observed that "[plerhaps it is naive
to assume that the Constitution will often prevail when political interests are threatened." Paul Brest, The
Conscientious Legislator's Guide to Constitutional Interpretation, 27 STAN. L. REv. 567, 601 (1975). See also
John Q. La Fond, Washington's Sexually Violent Predator Law: A Deliberate Misuse of the Therapeutic State for
Social Control, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 655, 702 (1992) ("No politician wants to face a sixty second political
attack on television by his campaign opponent claiming 'he voted against community safety and in favor of
sexually violent predators.' "); Michael J. Perry, The Constitution, the Courts and the Question of Minimalism, 88
Nw. U. L. Rev. 138 (1993) ("The principal reason for doubting that ordinary politicians can generally do a good
job of specifying constitutional indeterminacy is that for most members of the Congress, incumbency is a
fundamental value.").
Testament to the appeal of the sex offender issue is seen in Washington State, in the "Tennis Shoe Brigade," so
named because its members sent thousands of sneakers to legislators in 1990 in symbolic concern for the victims
of child sex abuse. One brigade member, Patty Murray, was elected to the U.S. Senate in 1994. Another leader, Ida
Ballasiotes, is now a State representative. Turning Point: The Revolving Door: When Sex Offenders Go Free
(ABC television broadcast, Sept. 21, 1994).
AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:1261
think that legislators, many of whom are educated in the law, would be sensitive to
constitutional demands with respect to retroactive sanctions, reality and reason
dictate to the contrary.355 In the meantime, there is much work to be done if the Ex
Post Facto Clause is to be resurrected from the constitutional dust heap to which it
has now been relegated by the Court.356
355. In striking down on ex post facto grounds the notification provision of New York's "Megan's Law," a
holding later reversed by the Second Circuit in the wake of Hendricks, Judge Dennis Chin commented on the
constitutional doubts voiced by Assembly members who nonetheless were willing to " 'take a chance regardless
of what it may be, the Constitution,' because of their view that sex offenders did not deserve protection." Doe v.
Pataki, 940 F. Supp. 603, 622 n.15 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), rev'd, 120 F.3d 1263 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct.
1066 (1998). Judge Chin also noted that one bill sponsor acknowledged that the law was "punitive to a degree by
describing the effort made to 'assure' that the Act would be considered 'more regulatory than punitive.' "Id.
One can also plausibly infer from the sponsor's statement a self-conscious desire to "shade" the law in such a
way as to militate in favor of a nonpunitive inference. A similar mentality appeared to pervade the evolution of
Washington State's sexual predator law. A member of the task force which drafted the law commented that she
was aware that the law "flies in the face of the Bill of Rights." Turning Point, supra note 309. Indeed, Kansas's
decision to place the SVPA in its probate code can be interpreted as another such instance.
In light of the foregoing, and with no reason to think that such sentiments are unrepresentative of typical
legislative sentiment, Professor Brest's hope in 1975 that legislators will take to heart, and be motivated by
constitutional constraints, would appear to be in vain. See generally Brest, supra note 354. See also Illinois v.
Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 366 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (dissenting from the majority's invocation of the
"good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule with regard to police reliance on a statute authorizing warrantless
administrative searches: "Providing legislatures a grace period during which police may freely perform
unreasonable searches ... creates a positive incentive to promulgate unconstitutional laws.").
356. Like so many other areas of constitutional law in the past twenty years, some hope for this resuscitation
might lie in state constitutional law. As noted by long-time California Supreme Court Justice Stanley Mosk:
When the Supreme Court truck careens from one side of the constitutional road to the other, state
courts have two alternatives. They can shift gears and also change directions, thus achieving
subservient consistency with Washington. Or, they can retain existing individual rights by reliance
on the independent non-federal grounds found in the several state constitutions.
Mosk, supra note 19, at 561.
Virtually all states have some ex post facto provision in their Constitution, not all identical in form to their
federal counterpart. As a result, the promise exists that individual "bulwarks" against retroactive penal laws can
be erected in the states themselves. See Neil C. McCabe & Cynthia A. Bell, Ex Post Facto Provisions of State
Constitutions, 4 EMERGtNG ISSUES ST. CoNT. L. 133, 133 n.4 (1991) (stating that forty-six of the fifty states have
provisions that ban ex post facto laws). The authors observe that least one state, Tennessee, apparently affords
greater protection than that afforded by the federal Ex Post Facto Clause. Id. at 148-51 (citing and discussing
Miller v. State, 584 S.W.2d 758 (Tenn. 1979)). See generally Jennifer Friesen, State Courts as Sources of
Constitutional Law: How to Become Independently Wealthy, 72 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 1065 (1997) (discussing
growth of independent state constitutional law and lauding the trend).
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